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However,

since

plaintiff initiated the action here in Utah and has relied on Utah
law

throughout

the

proceedings,

defendants

contend

that

the

plaintiff has waived its right to interpretation of the transaction
under Pennsylvania law.
JURISDICTION
This

appeal

is

taken

to

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

by

defendants Okudas and Conlins pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j),
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.

Since the filing of the

Notice of Appeal, the Utah Supreme Court has assigned this appeal
to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 4A, Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court.

This appeal is further filed pursuant to Rules 3(a)

and 4(a), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and pursuant to Rule
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendants appeal the summary judgment granted plaintiff
by

the

trial

court

on

the

issues

pertaining

to

liability.

Defendants further appeal the trial court's order that the issues
of damages and attorneys' fees be submitted by affidavit without
trial or hearing.
The defendants further appeal the issue of the propriety
of the damages and attorneys1

fee awarded

by the trial court.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendants were sued as guarantors of a transaction which
is referred to as a Preferred Vehicle Lease Agreement.
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that

plaintiff

impaired

the

collateral and is barred from seeking damages.
Plaintiff obtained a summary judgment on the issue of
liability.

Subsequently, the trial court, by telephone conference,

directed the parties to submit their "positions" on damages by
affidavit

and

memorandum.

Defendants

objected

to

plaintiff's

attorney's affidavit on attorneys' fees because of the failure to
state the hourly rate at which the four

(4) attorneys rendered

services to plaintiff on this case. Defendants moved to strike the
affidavit.

The trial court denied defendants motion.

The trial

court, thereafter, awarded damages and attorney's fees without a
hearing or trial.
Defendants filed a cross-claim against Roy Mallory.

The

cross-claim was stayed because Roy Mallory filed for relief under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. He was later discharged from the
obligations referred to in the cross-claim.
Defendants also filed a third party complaint against
Maureen Mallory.

She has submitted a motion to bifurcate which

awaits the trial court's ruling.
The trial court entered judgment as a final judgment
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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ERR

IN

AWARDING

T< I

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Article I, Sec. 7, Constitution of Utah.

2.

Section 78-2-2 (3) (j) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended.

3.

Section 70A-9-504 (3) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended.

4.

Rule 4-501 (5), Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

5.

Rule 4-505(1), Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

6.

Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case:
This is an action for recovery of damages for breach of
a contract entitled Preferred Vehicle Lease Agreement which was
prepared

by plaintiff.

(RA 13).

Plaintiff

seeks

damages pursuant to the provisions in the agreement.

to recover

(RA 23, para.

18.2).
The defendants personally guaranteed performance of the
agreement in the event the primary obligor, M.C.O., Inc. defaulted
in its performance.

(RA 111, 113).

Defendants defend on the basis that the plaintiff should
not be permitted to seek damages because the contract is a security
agreement which is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code and the
plaintiff failed to comply with the requirement that the collateral
be disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner.
Even if the contract is deemed a lease, the provisions
of the document provide that the vehicles will be disposed of in

6

a commercially reasonable manner and defendants contend that the
plaintiff failed to comply with this provisionDefendants also assert that the plaintiff failed to
mitigate its damages and is, therefore, estopped from seeking
damages or should not be awarded the damages that are claimed.
Finally, defendant contends that the plaintiff permitted
the impairment of the collateral and is estopped from seeking
damages against the defendants.

(RA 379-390)

Procedural issues relate to the propriety of the summary
judgment granted on the issue of liability, to the trial court's
order that issues pertaining to damages and attorneys' fees be
submitted by affidavit and memorandum, and to the propriety of the
award of attorneys' fee.
Course of Proceedings:
Plaintiff was granted summary judgment on the issue of
liability.

(RA 473, 474-477).

Thereafter, the parties were

directed by the trial court to simultaneously submit affidavits and
memorandums on damages and attorneys' fees by a date certain. The
trial court did not request nor obtain the defendants stipulation
to proceed on affidavits and memorandums.

Defendants objected to

plaintiff's attorney's affidavit for attorneys' fees and moved to
strike the affidavit because of its deficiency in failing to state
the rate of the hourly charges used by four (4) attorneys.
531).

Defendants' motion was denied.

(RA

(RA 550, 551).

Disposition:
The trial court, thereafter, by telephone conference,
7

discussed

his

observations

on

the

damage

issues

and

rendered

judgment awarding plaintiff damages and attorneys' fees-

Defen-

dants appealed from that judgment.
Relevant Facts:
The

Defendants

Conlin

and

Okuda,

together

with

Roy

Mallory, initiated an auto rental agency under the name of M.C.O.,
Inc., doing business under the assumed name of American International

Rent-A-Car.

The

American

International

name was

used

pursuant to a franchise or license agreement with the national
company.
The Plaintiff, LMV Leasing, Inc., provided financing for
some of the vehicles which M.C.O., Inc., used as its fleet of
rental automobiles.

The document which the parties utilized to

transact their business is entitled Preferred Vehicle Lease Agreement.

(RA 13).

However, certain verbiage in the lease document

suggests that the transactions may, in fact, have been intended as
a security agreement, governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. For
example, provisions for default reflect an express agreement by
Plaintiff to dispose of the vehicles in a commercially reasonable
manner which is the Utah Uniform Commercial Code requirement for
disposal of collateral in a secured transaction. (RA 23, para. 19).
Equally

suggestive of a security agreement

is verbiage to the

effect that Defendants will be paid any excess from sales proceeds
of the vehicle, if there is an excess.

(RA 24, para. 19).

The Defendants Conlin and Okuda and their wives signed
guaranty agreements with Plaintiff to guaranty payment in the event

8

of M.C.O., Inc.'s default.

(RA 111, 113).

The guaranty agreement, also provided by Plaintiff, does
not contain verbiage whereby the Defendants waive their right to
notices of default nor does

it contain verbiage by which

the

Defendants waive their defense of collateral impairment.
In May, 1987, the principal shareholders and incorporators of M.C.O., Inc., became embroiled in internal conflict which
resulted in a claimed "repossession" of the entire business of
M.C.O., Inc., by Roy Mallory, an incorporator, officer, director
and a creditor of M.C.O., Inc.

A state court action ensued and

eventually, in August of 1987, Roy W. Mallory, one of the Defendants in this action, but not a party to this appeal, filed a
petition in the Bankruptcy Court under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code to forestall the state court action.

The Chapter 11 petition

was eventually converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding by application
of the U. S.

Trustee.

(RA 387-390).

In December of 1987, before the vehicles were repossessed
by Plaintiff, the Defendants Okuda and Conlin, together with the
attorney for M C O . , Inc. bankruptcy, Loren E. Weiss, conveyed to
Plaintiff's attorney in Salt Lake City, Utah, a proposal from one
Alma Demar Egbert who offered to either assume the M.C.O., Inc.
agreement with LMV Leasing or purchase the vehicles in question,
in place, at the American International premises because Egbert had
obtained the rights to the American International franchise after
M.C.O., Inc., defaulted in the franchise payments.

Plaintiff did

not respond to the offer nor did Plaintiff communicate any ac9

knowledgment of the offer.

(RA 283-288).

Approximately March 11, 1988, the Plaintiff took possession of the vehicles it had provided financing for M.C.O., Inc.,
and the vehicles were placed with Nate Wade Subaru, a local new and
used car dealer, to be sold for Plaintiff.

(RA 328).

The "Notice of Sale" states that cars will be sold after
April 13, 1988, at the Nate Wade Subaru lot "and will be sold in
the same manner and fashion as other used vehicles located at Nate
Wade Subaru."

(RA 328).

All of the repossessed vehicles were sold between May 10
and June 10, 1988.

(RA 326, para. 11).

Plaintiff initiated this action in April of 1988, seeking
damages for breach of the lease agreement.

Defendants Okudas and

Conlins were named as defendants because of their personal guarantees .
Defendants Okudas and Conlins claimed, as part of their
defense, that Plaintiff permitted the impairment of the collateral
after default, that Plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages, and
further that the disposal of the vehicles was not done in a commercially reasonable manner and, therefore, Plaintiff should not be
permitted to recover for the alleged damages.

(RA 379).

In August, 1988, Plaintiff moved for Summary Judgment on
the issues of liability and damages.

(RA 242). Defendants Okudas

and Conlins resisted on the basis that material issues of fact
remained to be litigated as to Plaintiff's failure to mitigate
damages, as to whether the transaction was a lease or a security
10

agreement subject to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, as to the
Plaintiff's failure to dispose of the vehicles in a commercially
reasonable manner, and as to the issue of damages and mitigation
of damages.

(RA 278, 396). The trial court, after oral argument

on the 13th day of October, 1988, denied Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

(RA 402).

The Defendants filed cross-claims and third party complaints against Roy W. Mallory and Maureen Mallory.

Roy W. Mallory

filed a petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code and, therefore, the Plaintiff's claim and Defendants Okuda and
Conlin's cross-claim against Roy W. Mallory were stayed.

(RA 412) .

Maureen Mallory moved for bifurcation of the third party
action and awaits the trial court's decision on bifurcation.
On the 13th day of February, 1989, Plaintiff moved for
Summary Judgment as to liability only.

(RA 448). This subsequent

motion was submitted pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.

Plaintiff submitted the Affidavit of Edward T.

McCracken dated August

4, 1988, which had been submitted

Plaintiff's earlier motion for summary judgment.

with

(RA 250, 423).

The McCracken affidavits do not state whether the vehicles were advertised for sale as the other used cars of Nate Wade
Subaru are advertised; it does not state who was invited to bid;
it does not state whether the cars were sold to the highest bidder;
it does not state that the sales prices were within acceptable
range of similar vehicles sold in Salt Lake City.

(Compare RA 250,

323, 423) . The McCracken affidavits do not rebut the Affidavit of
11

Alma Demar Egbert to the effect that an offer was made in December
of 1987 to assume the auto leases or to purchase the vehicles, in
place, at the American International business premises since Egbert
had assumed the American International franchise.
other opposing

{RA 283).

No

affidavits were submitted to rebut Egbert's af-

fidavit .
The Affidavit of Ivar Blackner, who was acting in behalf
of Defendants, to the effect that he was denied the right on three
(3) separate occasions to inspect the vehicles in anticipation of
submitting bids remains unopposed.

(RA 393 Affidavit of Blackner).

Loren E. Weiss, attorney for M.C.O., Inc., in its bankruptcy proceedings, submitted an affidavit stating he personally
communicated

to plaintiff's

attorney, Wes Harris of Watkiss &

Campbell, an offer by Egbert to purchase or lease, in place, all
of the vehicles plaintiff provided to M.C.O., Inc.

Mr. Weiss

further states that neither he nor M.C.O., Inc., received a response to that offer.

(RA 286-288).

Affidavit of Conlin dated the 20th day of February, 1989,
to the effect that he had authority to buy the vehicles for a
vehicle dealer in Las Vegas, Nevada, and would have done so, except
for the problem encountered by Blackner is unopposed.

(RA 467

Affidavit of Conlin).
The Affidavit of David Wilden to the effect that Val J.
Conlin had

authority

to purchase

the repossessed

resale in Las Vegas, Nevada, is unopposed.
Wilden).
12

vehicles for

(RA 470 Affidavit of

Notwithstanding the Affidavits of Conlin, Wilden, Egbert,
Blackner, and Weiss, the trial court granted plaintiff's Second
Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of liability on the basis
that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact regarding
liability.

Included in this judgment of liability is a statement

that the remaining issue on damages would be determined by Affidavits or hearing.

(RA 474-476 Judgment on Liability).

Defendants were notified by telephone on March 1, 1989,
that the trial court had granted plaintiff's Second Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Defendants subsequently received a copy of the

unsigned Final Judgment of Liability on March 6, 1989.
On March

13, 1989, Brad Willis, Judge Brian's Clerk,

telephoned and arranged for a telephone conference with counsel for
plaintiff

and defendants.

On March

14, 1989, Judge

Brian by

telephone conference stated the issue of damages would be determined by Affidavits and Memorandums to be submitted by plaintiff
and defendants simultaneously.

The parties were given two (2)

weeks to file Affidavits and Memorandum of damages.
At th'e direction of the trial court, defendants Okudas
and Conlins submitted the second Affidavit of Val J. Conlin which
was directed primarily at the issue of damages.
of Conlin dated March 18, 1989).

(RA 488 Affidavit

However, by Memorandum, defen-

dants contended that the plaintiff may have avoided all damages if
plaintiff had diligently pursued the Egbert offer to assume or
purchase the vehicles while the vehicles were still at the American
International

lot,

and

before

repossession
13

had

taken

place.

Consequently, the defendants contended that, depending upon the
facts proven in this case, plaintiff may have been made whole on
the transaction with defendants had plaintiff pursued the Egbert
offer to purchase or assume the lease.

(RA 492-498 Defendants1

Memorandum dated March 31, 1989).
On April

25, 1989, Brad Willis

again arranged

for a

telephone conference with the trial court, counsel for Plaintiff,
and counsel for Defendants. On April 26, 1989, Judge Brian stated,
by telephone conference, his decision on the issue of damages.
The Final Judgment on liability and damages was received
by counsel

for defendants

Conlins

and Okudas on May

although the judgment was dated May 4, 1989.

1, 1989,

(RA 544 Final Judg-

ment dated May 4, 1989).
As part of the judgment, plaintiff was awarded attorneys1
fees of $13,500.00 based on an Affidavit of Brett F. Wood dated
April 21, 1989.

(RA 551).

The Affidavit, paragraph 10, lists the

hours expended by the respective attorneys but does not state what
rate was charged by each of the four (4) attorneys.

(RA 526-530).

Defendants Okuda and Conlin objected to the adequacy of
the Affidavit for Attorney's Fees and moved to strike the Affidavit
for failure to comply with Rule 4-505(1), Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, pertaining
reasonableness of that rate.

to the hourly

rate charged

and

the

(RA 531)•

The trial court ruled that the Affidavit was adequate and
awarded the sum of $13,500.00 as attorney's fees.
Final Judgment dated May 4, 1989).
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(RA 544-552

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment

on liability because there was an unresolved issue of fact as to
whether the transaction sued upon was a lease or a security agreement.
2.

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment

because there remained an unresolved issue of fact as the whether
the vehicles were disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner
as required by Section 70A-9-504(3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended.
3.

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment

because there remained an unresolved issue of fact on the commercially reasonable disposition of the vehicles as required by the
terms of the agreements.
4.

The

trial

court erred

in

granting summary

judgment because there remained an unresolved issue of fact as to
whether plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages.

If plaintiff

failed to mitigate its damages;
a) was plaintiff entitled to recover any damages?
b) if plaintiff was entitled to recover some damages,
what amount of damages was plaintiff entitled to?
5.
because

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment

there remained

an unresolved

issue of

fact as to the

impairment of the collateral by plaintiff.
6.
submit

The trial court erred in directing the parties to

the issues of damages

and attorneys' fees on affidavit
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without trial or hearing because it deprives defendants of their
right to trial on those issues.

Furthermore, the trial court's

order that the affidavit and memorandum on damages be submitted
simultaneously denies defendants their right to due process because
it places upon defendants, a burden of disproving damages before
plaintiff carries its burden to prove damages and attorneys1 fees.
7.

The trial court erred in denying defendants' motion

to strike plaintiff's affidavit of attorneys' fees because the
affidavit did not state the hourly rate of the attorneys participating in behalf of plaintiff as required by Rule 4-505(1) , Utah Code
of

Judicial

Administration.

Defendants

contend

that

without

disclosure of the hourly rate at which attorneys' fees are sought
or awarded, defendants are unable to challenge the reasonableness
of the fees requested*
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY BECAUSE THERE
REMAINED AN ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THE
TRANSACTION SUED UPON WAS A LEASE AGREEMENT OR
A SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Plaintiff

initiated

this

action

seeking

to

recover

damages for breach of the agreement entitled, "Preferred Vehicle
Lease Agreement." Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, plaintiff
sought damages which represented the full-term lease price, less
the sales proceeds of the repossessed vehicles, less interest for
the remaining term of the lease computed at 6 percent.

The actual

interest rate on the transaction was at two percent over prime
computed monthly as of the 15th day of each month.
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As part of defendants1 second amended answer, defendants
alleged that the transaction was a sales agreement rather than a
lease agreement

and, therefore, provisions of

the Utah Uniform

Commercial Code were applicable to this transaction; more specifically, provisions requiring the commercially reasonable disposition
or sale of the collateral.

(RA 371)

The Preferred Vehicle Lease Agreement, which was provided
by the plaintiff, contains provisions and verbiage that suggests
the transaction was intended as an installment sales contract or
a security agreement rather than a lease.
For example, the document contains verbiage such as "Purchase Orders," (RA 14, para. 1.14) and contains a disclaimer as to
"merchantability of the vehicle." (RA 16, para. 5 ) . The document
provides for acceleration in the event of default and prescribes
a commercially reasonable sale of the vehicles.

(RA 22, para. 18,

RA 23, para. 19)
The document suggests that the purchaser may gain some
"equity" in the vehicles.

The document provides that defendants

will be paid any surplus or excess after the sale of the vehicles
if a surplus is realized after termination by expiration or default
of the agreement. (RA 23-24, para. 19). Schedule A to the agreement further suggests that the parties intended a sales-security
agreement rather than a lease agreement.

(RA 237).

appears to provide plaintiff a sales commission of
vehicle M.C.O. obtains through the plaintiff.

Paragraph 1
$75.00 per

Paragraph 2 outlines

what appears to be a commission of $75.00 per vehicle on the resale
17

of the vehicles upon termination or expiration of the individual
agreements.

The wording is to the effect that plaintiff

will

receive $75.00 for each vehicle "sold by LMV on behalf of M.C.O.,
Inc., DBA/American International Car Rental."

(Emphasis added) (RA

237, para. 2)
The document further provides for sales margin in favor
of plaintiff of $100.00 over invoice or 2% over procurement cost
of all vehicles acquired by the defendants. (RA 28, para 6 ) .
As part of this agreement, defendants were obligated to
pay

for

insurance,

service,

repair,

responsible for any risk of loss.

license,

(RA 13-31).

taxes

and

were

A review of the

entire transaction leads to the obvious conclusion that plaintiff
does not have cars to lease but is merely a financier who makes
loans for acquisition of vehicles by commercial entities.
In Colonial

Leasing Company of

New England,

Inc. v.

Larsen Brothers Construction Co. , 731 P.2d 483 (Utah, 1986), the
Utah Supreme Court outlined the factors which must be considered
when determination is required on whether a document is a lease or
a security agreement which may afford the protection of Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code.

Justice Stewart, writing for the

Court stated:
"Numerous factors bear on determining
whether the terms of an agreement show that it
was meant to be a lease or a security agreement. Among others, those factors are whether
(1) the lessor is a financier, (2) the lessee
is required to insure the goods in favor of the
lessor, (3) the lessee bears the risk of loss
or damage, (4) the lessee is to pay the taxes,
repairs,
maintenance,
(5)
the
agreement
establishes
default
provisions
governing
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acceleration and resale, (6) a substantial nonrefundable deposit is required, (7) the goods
are to be selected from a third party by the
lessee, (8) the rental payments were equivalent
to the costs of the goods plus interest, (9)
the lessor lacks facilities to store or retake
the goods, (10) the lease may be discounted
with a bank, (11) the warranties usually found
in leases are omitted, and (12) the goods or
fixtures are impractical to remove*"
In this case most of the factors enumerated in Colonial
are contained in the agreement.

These provisions, considered with

other factors outlined earlier, such as the provision that the
plaintiff would receive $75.00 for each vehicle plaintiff sold

M

in

behalf of M.C.O., Inc.," strongly suggests that the transaction in
question was intended to be a security agreement rather than a
lease.
In reversing the summary judgment granted to the plaintiff in Colonial, Justice Stewart states:
" In sum, whether a lease was intended as
a security for a sale is a question to be
determine/! on the facts of each case, as is the
issue of whether the nature of the document
raises questions of fact that preclude summary
judgment." (Id)
Defendants contend that the document in question contains
sufficient indications which suggest that the document was a sales
and security agreement and not a lease.
fore,

erred

in

not

permitting

The trial court, there-

defendants

the

opportunity

litigate that issue of fact.
POINT II : THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE REMAINED AN
UNRESOLVED FACTUAL ISSUE AS TO WHETHER THE
VEHICLES WERE DISPOSED OF IN A COMMERCIALLY
REASONABLE MANNER.
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to

If the document is deemed

to be a sale and

security

agreement, plaintiffs would have been obliged to carry the burden
of proof as to whether the vehicles were disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner.
notated, 1953, as amended.

Section 70A-9-504(3),

Utah Code An-

This provision has been held to require

the secured party to prove that every aspect of the sale of the
vehicles was commercially reasonable.

Haggis Management, Inc. v.

Turtle Management, Inc., 745 P.2d 442 (Utah, 1985).

Chief Justice

Hall, speaking for the Court stated:
"Whether proper notice of the disposition
was sent to the debtor is but one factor to be
considered in determining whether the disposition was commercially reasonable under section
9-504(3).
In addition, we must consider
whether 'every aspect of the disposition
including the method, manner, time, place and
terms' was commercially reasonable. Of prime
importance, are the secured party's attempts
to obtain a fair price for the collateral by
advertising the collateral or otherwise notifying potential buyers that the collateral is for
sale. Haggis asserts that before the sale to
Chianti, potential buyers were solicited. The
record shows there was no advertisement or
public notice of sale and that, at most, only
a few potential buyers were contacted and no
firm bids were received before the sale to
Chianti. Such minimal efforts are insufficient
as a matter of law to establish that the
collateral was sold in a commercially reasonable manner." (Emphasis added)
"Generally, a secured party who fails to
dispose of collateral
in a commercially
reasonable manner is barred from recovering a
deficiency judgment. Inasmuch as the disposition of the collateral in this case was not
commercially reasonable, plaintiff is barred
from recovering a deficiency judgment against
the guarantors." (Emphasis added)
In

the

instant

case,
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the

plaintiff

repossessed

the

vehicles and placed them with Nate Wade Subaru, a new and used car
dealer

in Salt Lake City, Utah.

No evidence was provided

by

plaintiff to indicate what advertising was done before the sale of
the vehicles nor did plaintiff indicate who was permitted to bid
on or purchase

the repossessed

vehicles.

The notice

of

sale

provides that the vehicles will be sold by Nate Wade Subaru "in
the same manner and fashion as other used vehicles located at Nate
Wade Subaru."

(RA 328)

In Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc. v. Glaubensklee, 649 P.2d
28

(Utah, 1982) , the Utah

Supreme Court ruled that a used

car

dealer should at least advertise the sale of a repossessed vehicle
in a newspaper of general circulation for a reasonable period of
time.

Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court stated:
" Although there may be exceptions, (citation omitted) we think that in general an
automobile dealer should advertise a repossessed car in a newspaper of general circulation for a reasonable period of time and in a
manjier consistent with the manner by which
other used cars are advertised."
Since the plaintiff in this case elected to place the

cars at Nate Wade Subaru and sell them "in the same manner and
fashion as other used vehicles at Nate Wade Subaru," plaintiff was
obligated to advertise the sale of the vehicles in a newspaper of
general circulation for a reasonable period of time.
The defendants do not dispute the claim that notification
of the sale was sent by plaintiff.

However, defendants contend

that after notice was received, they sent one Ivar Blackner to
inspect the vehicles in anticipation of submitting bids to purchase
21

the vehicles.

Defendants contend that three (3) separate attempts

were made by Blackner

to inspect

the vehicles

but he was not

permitted to inspect the vehicles in anticipation of bidding on
them.

Defendants also contend that they were financially capable

of purchasing the vehicles had they been afforded the opportunity
to do so. (RA 393, 467, 470, 488, Affidavits of Blackner, Conlin,
Wilden.)
The Utah Supreme Court, in K.J. Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah, 1985), held:
"The purpose of the notice requirement is
for the protection of the debtor, by permitting
him to bid at the sale, or arrange for interested parties to bid, and to otherwise assure
that the sale is conducted in a commercially
reasonable manner"
Since

the defendants, in this case, were prevented from

bidding on the vehicles, the Court should determine, as matter of
law,

that

the

sale

was

not

commercially

reasonable

and

that

plaintiff, is therefore, not entitled to a deficiency judgment,
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE REMAINED AN
UNRESOLVED QUESTION OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THE
VEHICLES WERE DISPOSED OF IN A COMMERCIALLY
REASONABLE MANNER AS REQUIRED BY THE AGREEMENT.
Even if defendants were to concede, for the purpose of
this argument, that the transaction in question was a lease rather
than a security agreement, the document provides that the repossessed vehicles will be sold in a commercially reasonable manner.
The document does not define what commercially reasonable disposition means.

Since

the phrase

is apparently
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adopted

from

the

Uniform Commercial Code, the logical assumption is that the phrase
requires

the

required

by

same
the

tests

Uniform

of

commercial

Commercial

reasonableness

Code.

The

that

arguments

is
and

citations on the issue of the commercially reasonable disposition
of the collateral, whether required by the Uniform Commercial Code
or by agreement are identical.

Defendants adopt the arguments and

citations advanced under the previous heading.
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE REMAINED AN
ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS
ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING RECOVERY BECAUSE OF
IMPAIRMENT OF THE COLLATERAL.
As part of defendants1 second amended complaint, defendants alleged that the plaintiff violated its fiduciary duty to
defendants and also permitted the impairment of the collateral and,
therefore, should be estopped from seeking recovery from defendants.

(RA 371) .
As stated earlier in this brief, the plaintiff ignored

the offer of Alma Dl Egbert and permitted Roy Mallory and Alma D.
Egbert to use the vehicles for rentals from at least, December,
1987, to March of 1988, before plaintiff elected to repossess the
vehicles.

(RA 278-282).

Furthermore, after repossessing the cars,

the plaintiff failed to advertise the vehicles for sale and refused
to permit defendants to inspect the vehicles so defendants could
intelligently bid on the vehicles.
In Valley Bank and Trust Company v. Rite Way Concrete
Forming, Inc., 742 P.2d 105 (Utah, 1987), defendants, guarantors,
were sued by the bank because the debtor defaulted in its obliga-
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tion.

The defendants informed the bank where the collateral was

located but the bank did not attempt to recover the collateral and,
instead, elected
another claimant.

to release its

interest

to the collateral

to

The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the summary

judgment granted by the trial court to the bank.

Judge Garff,

speaking for the court stated:
"However, a guarantor, upon payment of
the guaranteed obligation, has a right of
subrogation to any collateral pledged as
security. (Citations omitted)
This is true
even of an absolute guarantor. This right to
subrogation is a 'creature of equity' whose
'purpose is the prevention of injustice and is
the mode which equity adopts to compel the
ultimate payment of a debt by one who in
justice, equity, and good conscience ought to
pay it.' (Citations omitted.)
The rationale
is that the creditor, having elected to proceed
against security for payment of the debt, is
deemed to be in a trustee relationship with the
guarantor.
The creditor may liquidate the
security and apply the proceeds to the obligation, or he may forego recourse to the security
and proceed against the guarantor of payment,
provided he does not subvert the guarantor's
subrogation rights against collateral pledged
by the principal obligor. If he breaches that
trust duty by destroying, losing, or otherwise
improvidently dissipating the collateral, he
may not hold the guarantor wholly liable
because the guarantor would have been subrogated to the creditor's right of resort to
that security. (Citation omitted) Thus, where
a creditor's actions impair the value of the
collateral in its possession which secures an
obligation guaranteed by a guarantor, either
absolute or conditional, the guarantor will be
discharged from his obligation to the extent
of the impairment."
In the instant case, the collateral

was permitted to

remain in the possession of strangers to this transaction and in
use as rentals long after the plaintiff was entitled to possession.
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Furthermore, once plaintiff
defendants the opportunity

took possession, it did not permit
to bid on the vehicles nor did

plaintiff advertise the sale of the vehicles.

the

Under these cir-

cumstances, defendants contend that there is, at least, an issue
of fact as to whether the plaintiff violated defendants'/guarantors ' right to subrogation to the collateral by denying defendants
the right to bid on and purchase the collateral.
Additionally, there is the question of whether plaintiff
permitted the impairment of the collateral by permitting persons,
namely Alma D. Egbert and company, not directly accountable to
plaintiff, to defendants or to the primary obligor, M.C.O., Inc.,
to use the vehicles as rentals long after plaintiff was entitled
to possession of the vehicles and entitled to sell the collateral
without permitting defendants to bid on or purchase the vehicles*
Defendants assert that they should be relieved of their
obligation

as a matter

impairment of

of law because

the collateral

plaintiff permitted

and plaintiff

the

deprived defendants

their right of subrogation to the collateral.
POINT V:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE REMAINED ISSUES
OF FACTS AS TO DAMAGES AND MITIGATION OF
DAMAGES.
Shortly after receiving notification and prior to the
sale of the repossessed vehicles, the defendants requested Ivar
Blackner, a person engaged in the automobile sales business, to
inspect the repossessed vehicles which were being stored at Nate
Wade Subaru in Salt Lake City, Utah.
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By affidavit, Mr. Blackner

states he attempted on three (3) separate occasions to inspect the
vehicles but was not permitted to see the vehicles. (RA 393)
Defendant Conlin submitted affidavits stating that he,
as manager of a used car division of an automobile leasing and
sales company

in

Las Vegas, Nevada,

vehicles had the plaintiff permitted
hicles.

(RA 468)

would have purchased

the

the inspection of the ve-

The owner of the business in Las Vegas, Nevada,

Mr. Wilden, submitted an affidavit confirming that Defendant Conlin
had authority to purchase the vehicles for resale in Las Vegas.
(RA 470-471).
Prior to the repossession of the vehicles by plaintiff,
counsel for plaintiff in Salt Lake City was contacted by attorney
Loren Weiss and informed that one Alma D. Egbert was interested in
either assuming the defendants' lease or in purchasing the vehicles
from plaintiff.
for

This information was conveyed by Weiss to counsel

the plaintiff

by December of

1987, approximately

four

(4)

months before the plaintiff's repossessed the vehicles. (RA 286288) .
Alma D. Egbert submitted an affidavit that he had earlier
submitted an offer to the officers of plaintiff corporation to
either assume the lease or purchase the vehicles in place at the
M.C.O., Inc., business location.

This offer was made because Mr.

Egbert had procured the American International Rent-A-Car franchise
which M.C.O., Inc., had lost because of default in payments.

(RA

283-285).
Plaintiff's did not respond to either communications.
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However, plaintiff offers, after the fact, for summary judgment
purposes, a copy of a petition in bankruptcy for Alma D. Egbert
which was filed in August of 1987.

(RA 518),

Yet Mr. Weiss states

in his affidavit that Mr. Egbert, in December of 1987 assumed or
satisfied several substantial debts that the defendants and MCO
Inc., had incurred.
If the evidence at trial were to show that Mr. Egbert
would have been able to assume the lease or purchase the vehicles
for the remaining balance of defendants' contract, it would be
possible that plaintiff would not have been entitled to any damages
because of its failure to mitigate its damages.

The degree of any

of plaintiff's loss would have been dependant upon the evidence at
trial.
If the evidence at trial proved that plaintiff failed to
mitigate

its

damages but

was, nevertheless,

entitled

to

some

damages, the factual issue remained as to the amount of damages
plaintiff suffered.,
In Utah Farm Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627
P.2d

62,

(Utah, 1981),

the Utah

Supreme Court

ruled

that the

defendant was barred from recovering from a breach of an agreement
where he failed to actively pursue other alternatives to mitigate
his losses.

In that case, Justice Hall, writing for the majority

stated:
"Where a contractual agreement has been
breached by a party thereto, the aggrieved
party is entitled to those damages that will
put him in as good a position as he would have
been had the other party performed pursuant to
the agreement.
A corollary to this rule is
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that the aggrieved party may not, either by
action or inaction, aggravate the injury
occasioned by the breach, but has a duty
actively to mitigate his damages..."
Where an alternative financing
source is available, other damages due to the
breach are generally avoidable, and hence not
compensable."
In the instant case, defendant contends that had plaintiff pursued the offer of Alma D. Egbert, or had plaintiff's agent,
Nate Wade

Subaru, not prevented defendants

from inspecting and

subsequently purchasing the vehicles, plaintiff may not have suffered a loss and, in any event, plaintiff would not have suffered
the loss it claims after the sale of the vehicles.
Since plaintiff failed to take any action to mitigate its
losses, plaintiff

should

be barred,

as a matter of

law, from

recovering damages.
POINT VI: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING
THE PARTIES TO SUBMIT THE ISSUES OF DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON AFFIDAVITS TO BE FILED
SIMULTANEOUSLY.
It is axiomatic in the field of law that the plaintiff
has

the burden of proving his damages or any other claim

plaintiff advances.

the

Only then is it incumbent upon the defendant

to present its evidence to counter that of the plaintiff.
In

the

instant

case,

the

trial

court

directed

the

defendant to submit its affidavit and memorandum on damages and
attorneys' fees simultaneously with that of the plaintiff.

In

effect, the court placed a burden upon the defendant to disprove
plaintiff's damages at the same time plaintiff was to submit it's
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proof

of

damages.

As

the

circumstances

developed,

plaintiff

submitted its affidavits on damages approximately three (3) weeks
after the trial court's deadline and after the defendant submitted
their affidavits and memorandum of damages.

(Compare filing dates

RA 492 and RA 502).
The Utah Court of Appeals has ruled that the improper
shifting of the burden of proof constitutes a violation of defendant's right to due process under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution.
In State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d

466

(Utah, 1988), the

trial court found the defendant guilty of possession and consumption of alcoholic beverages within the State of Utah although the
prosecution presented no evidence that the violation occurred in
Utah.

The trial court

justified

its decision

by stating

the

defendant did not present evidence to show he did not consume or
possess the alcoholic beverages in Utah.
reversed

the conviction.

Judge Orme,

The Utah Court of Appeals
speaking

for

the

court

stated:
"Without regard to the location of the
defendant's arrest, we find the presumption or
assumption used by the court unconstitutional
in that it shifted the burden of proof on the
fact of jurisdiction to defendant in violation
of the due process clause of Article 1, Section
7 of the Utah Constitution...."
Defendants contend that the trial court, in this case,
shifted the burden to the defendant to disprove damages simultaneous to the plaintiff's proof of damages and the rationale in
State v. Sorenson is controlling, albeit, this is a civil case and
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the issues are damages and attorneys1 fees rather than jurisdiction
of a criminal offense.
Defendants further assert that the trial court erred in
depriving defendants their right to trial on the issues of damages
and attorneys' fees.
After summary judgment on liability was rendered by the
trial court, the court announced, by telephone conference, that the
issues

of

damages

and

attorneys'

affidavits and memorandum.
simultaneously

submit

fees

would

be

submitted

by

The parties were given a deadline to

their

affidavits

and

memorandum.

The

defendants did not agree or stipulate to this procedure nor were
the parties asked if this procedure was acceptable.

Subsequently,

the trial court rendered judgment on damages and attorneys' fees
without trial or hearing.
In Christensen v. Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P. 2d 314, the
Utah Supreme Court outlined some of the factors to be considered
to determine

whether

a person was

provided

Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

due process

under

One of the factors

enumerated is a "fair opportunity to submit evidence, examine and
cross-examine witnesses."
The circumstances of this case did not

justify

the

determination of damages without a trial or hearing.
POINT VII: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEYS' FEES BECAUSE THE AFFIDAVIT FOR
ATTORNEYS' FEES DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 4-505(1), UTAH CODE OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AND CASE LAW.
Plaintiff submitted the affidavit of one of its attor30

neys, Brett F. Wood, in support of plaintiff's request for attorneys1 fees. (RA 526).

The affidavit reflects the cumulative hours

spent by each attorney on the case and also reflects the hours
spent by clerks and "other firm personnel."

While the hourly

rates of the non-attorneys are shown, the rates charged by the four
(4) attorneys are

not shown.

Rule 4-505(1), Utah Code of Judicial

Administration,

appears unclear as to whether the hourly rate charged by attorneys
must be stated in the affidavit.

However, when read in conjunction

with recent decisions, the intent of the Rule is clear.

Section

1 of the Rule reads:
"Affidavits in support of an award of
attorneys' fees must set forth specifically
the legal basis for the award, the nature of
the work performed by the attorney, the number
of hours spent to prosecute the claim to
judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the
matter to the stage for which attorneys' fees
are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of
the fees for comparable legal services. The
affidavit must also separately state the hours
by persons other than attorneys, for time
spent, work completed and hourly rate billed."
The Utah courts have consistently required evidence of
the reasonableness of the fees sought.

In Talley v. Talley, 739

P.2d 83 (Utah, 1987), the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's denial of attorney's fees because the attorney failed to
present evidence as to the reasonableness of the fees requested.
Judge Bench stated:
"Conspicuously absent is any evidence
'regarding the necessity of the number of hours
dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate
charged in light of the difficulty of the case
and the result accomplished, and the rates
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commonly charged for divorce actions in the
community."
(Emphasis added)
The Talley decision on attorneys' fees was reaffirmed in
Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah, 1989).
Although

the trial court in this case ruled that the

affidavit for attorneys' fees was sufficient to justify the award,
it is obviously impossible for the opposition to challenge the
reasonableness of the fees requested unless the rates charged by
each attorney is disclosed.

Without that disclosure, there would

be a failure of proof as to the reasonableness since no rate is
stated.

Under these circumstances, one is bound to inquire as to

how he is to prove or challenge the reasonableness of the rate
charged if the rate is not disclosed.
The trial court obviously erred in awarding attorneys'
fees and the attorneys' fees should be denied as a matter of law
because of the deficiency of Mr. Wood's affidavit.
CONCLUSION
In the instant case, the trial court, in effect, granted
summary

judgment

on

liability,

damages

and

attorneys'

fees,

notwithstanding the factual issues raised on these matters.
The trial court was obligated to view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the defendants which is the same standard
used by the Utah Supreme Court

and the Utah Court of Appeals.

Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
Rule

4-501(5),

Utah Code of Judicial

Administration,

states that all material facts set forth in movant's statement
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which remain uncontroverted are deemed to be true for the purpose
of summary judgment.

Although the rule is silent as to statements

of opposing party which remain uncontroverted, a logical corollary
of that rule is that uncontroverted statements of the defending
party, particularly those contained in affidavits, should also be
deemed to be true.
Furthermore, the Utah

Supreme Court has held

that a

single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of fact.
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983).
In the instant case, there were several issues of facts
pertaining to the nature of the agreement, to the reasonableness
of the sale of the vehicles, to the mitigation of or failure to
mitigate damages, and to the reasonableness of the attorneys1 fees
awarded.
Defendants submit that the Utah Court of Appeals should
rule, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff did not dispose of the
vehicles in a commercially reasonable manner and is, therefore, not
entitled to a deficiency judgment.
Defendants further submit that the plaintiff failed to
actively

pursue a possible

alternate contract

to mitigate

its

damages and plaintiff should, therefore, be denied recovery as a
matter of law.
Plaintiff should be denied recovery as a matter of law
for impairing the collateral to which the defendants had a right
of subrogation.
Finally, plaintiff should also be denied attorneys' fees
33

as a matter of law for failing to state the rates at which plaintiffs attorneys rendered their services to plaintiffIn the alternative, the judgment should be reversed and
the case remanded to the District Court for trial on all issues.
Respectfully submitted,

A/
Kenneth M. Hisatake

/V
D. Frank Wilkins
Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellants

34

CER 1 i I- U.A L 11 ui DELIVERY
I

hereby certify ttri
du 1 i •• <*r*.-a lo»
•-" 'if * u fYa enjoin*; iWief ol Appo luriCs- *o:
E. Bar lit* y Gesas, F.;.^
aid
] iam H« Christensen, E\sq.
ISS & CAMPBELL
3.0 South Main Struct, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
At tornnvi f^» ^ > ; - ••-! f *
Blake D. Miller, Esq.
HANSEN & ANDERSON
50 West Broadway, <. ;. h Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Ma 1 : •• •

1

/

*'ia

""^'

day or

V ,Q' t/e-a \fre I

1989.

/f S, *—

f\&* < * • * T •*
0 2 -2LMV.aOA

35

aut; and

ADDENDUM

E x h i b :i t A

Article

Exi : :

Sec.

I,

'-

70A-9

LK--J *

> >n>> i . ».uu i <JJ I u L ^ L a 11
r'tah

Code

Annotated,

air ond' «]
:.-. * K. -i S0PS < 1 > . Utah Code of Judicial Administration

Exi.
RA 13
R A

"

:

.

RA 3;;;8

Preferred Vehicle Lease Agreement
!

!

'

!

•

•

•

•

Glial

JLI:\

V

DKUd'l

Notice of Sale

AR

r; 1, §' i

i

co.;

:. v-, i r '.in.- T, • i c'."'.
' V a t e i")", 2 S II a i v,
L. lu-v. 4 7.i.
Restrictions on I
.i.^i.i To Bear Arms
-••State and Feder
' ;" anus Legislation,
p
98 I J Pa, I

Gun control laws, validity an '. v...i.->" i ••»
tion of, 28 A. L. B, 3d 845.
Law Reviews,
The Constitutional Right to Keep and

Sec, 7. [Due process of law.]
No person s 11 a 11 b e d e [) i• I v c (I t)iIt"il";", 1IiI:
process of law.
Comparable Provision,
Montana Const,, \i• t, 111, § 27.
Cross-Reference.
Eminent domain
seq.

generally',, 78-34.-1 et

In general.
"Due process of law" comes to us from
the Great Charter and is synonymous with
''law of the land." I t means that a party
shall have his day in court—trial. Jensen
v. Union Pac. By. Co., C I J. 253, 21 P. 991,
4 L. R. A. 724.
Due process of law is not necessarily
judicial process. People v, liasbrouck, 11
U. 291, 39 P. 918.
Judgment against defendant, not served
with process and not appearing either in
person or by attorney, would not be duo
process of law. Blyth & Fargo Co. v,
Swenson, 15 U. 345, 49 P. 1027.
I t is elementary that there can be no
judicial action affecting vested rights that
is not based upon some process or notice
whereby the interested parties are brought
within the jurisdiction of the judicial
tribunal about to render judgment. P a r r y
v. Bonneville Irr. Dist., 71 V. 202, 263 P.
751.
"Due process of law" requires that, before one can be bound by a judgment
affecting his property rights, some process
must be served upon him which in some
degree at least is calculated to give him
notice. Naisbitt v. Ilerrick, 70 U. 575,
290 P. 950.
Due process of law requires that notice
be given to the persons whose rights are
to be affected. I t hears beforo it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders
judgment only after trial. Biggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 89 U.
183, 51 P . 2d 645.
The phrase "due process of law" apparently originated with Lord Coke, who defined tho terms. Many attempts have been
made to further define duo process of law,
but all of them resolve into the thought
that a party shall have his day in court.
Christiansen v, Harris, 109 U." 1, 103 P.
2d 314.
In depriving a person of life or lib
erty, the essentials of due process are:
(a) the existence of a competent person,

,• i*t\'

or

p r o p iT ty,

\vi111o111 (111e

body, or agency authorized by law to determine the questions; (b) an inquiry
into the merits of the question by such
person, body or agency; (c) notice to the
person of the inauguration and purpose
of the inquiry and tho time at which
such person should appear if ho wishes
to be heard; (d) right to appear in person or by counsel; (e) fair opportunity
to submit evidence, examine and crossexamine witnesses; (f) judgment to be
rendered upon tho record thus made lit
the absence of statute laying down other
or more specific requirements, the above
conditions meet the demands of due
process. In the absence of specific pro*
visions to the contrary, duo process does
not require that any or all of these
requirements must bo in writing or in
any particular form, In the interests of
orderly procedure and certainty as to its
proceedings and action taken, any legally
constituted body or agency should as far
as practical have written records of all
proceedings before it, except whero other
wise provided bv law. Christian, sen v
Harris, 109 U. 1, 103 P. 2d 314.
In the trial of criminal cases the statutes prescribe certain rules of procedure,
which must bo substantially complied with
to keep tho proceedings within the due
processes of the law. A somewhat different set of rules is prescribed in civil
cases and in special proceedings. Some
rules, affecting all types, are not found in
tho statutes, but in that great basic body
of tho law commonly known as the decisions or rules of the courts. But all these
methods and means provided for tho protection and enforcement of human rights
have the samo basic requirements—that
no party can bo affected by such action,
until his legal rights have been the subject of an inquiry by a person or body
authorized by law to dctormino such
rights, of which inquiry tho party has duo
notice, and at which he had mi opportunity to bo hoard and to give evidence as
to his rights or defenses, Christiansen v.
Harris, 109 U. 1, 103 P. 2d 311.
While normally we think of "due process of law" as requiring judicial action,
yet "due process" is not necessarily judicial a ct ion. Christians e 11 v, J1; i r r i », J i) 9
II. I, 103 P. 2d 314.
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' : cxcli ided from i liapU'i,
. .
or disposition of collateral without
: t i n g permissible, 70A-9-205.

of the last sentence of subsec. (2); and n wide
minor changes in punctuation.
Cross-Refcrcnces,
Liability of secured p a r t y for failure to
c o m p l y w i t h p a r t 5 of t h i s c h a p t e r ,
70A-9-507.
Policy and scope of chapter, 70A-9-102.
Secured p a r t y ' s rights on disposition of
collateral, 70A-9-306.
Secured party's right to dispose of collateral after default, 70A-9-504.

7H/"1 'l.f,lll

- '•t-cf---cnces.
Secure ; :'ra:^.ictions <i> 227.
79 CJS o*pp. Jccui ed Ti ansactions § 10*1.
69 A m J u r 2d 469 to 473, Secured T r a n s actions §§ 580 to 582.

/OA-J-5U3. Secured party's right to lake possession after default.
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the
peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the
secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make
it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured
party which is reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal a
secured party may render equipment unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under section 70A-9-504. If a secured party
elects to proceed by process of law he may proceed by writ of replevin or
otherwise,
History:

L 1965, ch. 154, § 9-503.

Cross-Re fere n c e s.
."i Jred party's right to dispose of collat
ii I .i ft er defau 11, 70A-9*504.

- - 'alidity, under state law, of self-help
j ; j : ,. s ess ion of goods pursuant to UCC
$9 5 0 3 » 75 A L R 3d 1 0 6 L
La* ; Reviews,

Collateral References.
Secured Transactions <§=> 228,
79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions § 105.
69 A m J u r 2d 473 to 497, Secured T r a n s actions §§ 583 to 599,

• "; : !f h of t h e *?<*« a n f ^ e w Mexico's Unitorm Commercial Code, 4 Natural Resources
J, 85.
Note, Sniadach, Fuentes and Mitchell: A
Confusing Trilogy and U t a h P r e j u d g m e n t
Remedies, 1974 I Hah I Rev, 536,

}

f

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Replevin,
Where chattel mortgage provided that in
event default was made in payment of debt
mortgagee could take possession of property
and proceed to foreclose mortgage, mort-

gagee could m a i n t a i n action in claim and
delivery to recover such possession after
default, remedy by foreclosing mortgage not
being exclusive. Morgan v. Layton (1922) GO
U 280, 208 P 505.

7 0 A - 9 - 5 0 4, Sec u r e d party's r i g 1 11: t o d i s p o s e o fl c o 11 a t e r a 1 a f I: c r
default — Effect of disposition,
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otl lei wise dispose
of any or all of the collateral ii i its then condition or following any
commercially reasonable preparation or processing. Any sale of
goods is subject to the chapter on Sales (chapter 2), The proceeds
of disposition shall be applied in the order following to
345
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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODF

(a)

the reasonable expen
i retaking, holding, preparing for
sale or lease, selling, having and the like and, to the extent
provided for in the agreement and not prohibited by l.u the
reasonable attorneys' ff*es and legal expenses incurred b> the
secured party;
(b)
the satisfaction of indebtedness secured bj the senility
interest under which the disposition is made,
(c)
the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by an> subonlinate
security interest in the collateral if written notification of
demand therefor is received before distribution of the proceeds is completed. If requested by the secured party, the
holder of a subordinate security interest must seasonably
furnish reasonable proof of his interest, and unless he does
so, the secured party need not comply with his demand.
If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party
must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise
agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency. But if the underlying
transaction was a sale of accounts or chattel paper, the debtor is
entitled to any surplus or is liable for any deficiency only if the
security agreement so provides
Disposition of the collateral may be by public 01 pnvate plottedings and may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or
other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels anil tit an> tune,
and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition
including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable Unless collateral is perishable or threatens
to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of
any public salt or reasonable notification of I lie time after which
any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall
be sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed
after default a statement renouncing or modifying his right to notification of sale. In the case of consumer goods no other notification
need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to any other
secured party from whom the secured party has received (before
sending his notification to the debtor or before the debtor's renunciation of his rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in the
collateral. The secured party may buy at an) public sale and if the
collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or
is of a type which is the subject of widely distributor! stand ml
price quotations he may buy at private sahj
When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the
disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's
rights therein, discharges the security interest under which it is
made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto ihe
346

SECURED TRANSACTIONS

(5)

70A-9-504

purchaser takes free of all such rights and interests even though
the secured party fails to comply with the requirements of this part
or of any judicial proceedings
f.ii
ii 1 the case of a public sale, if i::i- p.;rchasci nas no knowledge of any defects in the sale and if he does r.ut buy In collusion with the secured party -'* i.-|->. - the* person
conducting the sale; or
(b)
in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith.
A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty,
ii idorsement, repurchase agreement or the like and who receives a
transfer of collateral from the secured party or is subrogated to
his rights has thereafter the rights and duties of the secured party.
Such a transfer of collateral is not a sale or disposition of the colljt«M 'l 'Mulor this chapter,

History:
272, § 38.

L 1%5, ch. 13-1, § 9-50-1; 1977, ch.

Compiler's Notes,
The 1977 amendment inserted "or lease"
near the beginning of subd. (1) (a); added the
second sentence of subsec. (2) relating to a
sale of accounts or chattel paper; substituted
"if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying his right to
notification o( sale" at the end of the third
sentence of subsec. (3) for "and except in the
case of consumer goods to any other person
who has a security interest in the collateral
and who has duly filed a financing statement
indexed in the name of the debtor in this
state or who is known by the secured party
to have a security interest in the collateral";
and inserted the fourth sentence of subsec.
(3) relating to notification of other secured
parties.
C ross-Refere n c e s.
Collateral not owned by debtor, 70A-9-112,
Compulsory disposition of collateral,
70A-9-505.
C o n t r a c t for sale of goods, breach by
buyer, resale by seller, 70A-2-706.
Policy and subject m a t t e r of chapter,
70A-9-102.
Secured party's liability for failure to cornply with part 5 of this chapter, 70A-9-507.

Notice of disposition.
Secured party is b.». .i . .,u:n um.i.'. ng a
deficiency judgment after a disposition of the
property securing the debt when* **
~" of
the disposition was given the d»
w
disposition was not conducted ;
r
cially reasonable manner FV
;'
Corp. v, P r o - P r i n t s f'r*7r< VM
Notice of sale.
Secured party should give notice of time
and place of sale of the collateral to a
guarantor of the debt. Zions First Nat, Bank
v. Hurst (1977) 570 P 2d 1031.
Collateral References,
Secured Transactions <S> 229 to 237, 240.
79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions §§ 106
to 113.
69 AmJur 2d 499 to 532, Secured Transactions §§602 to 624.
Rights and duties of parties to conditional
sales contract as to resale of repossessed
property, 49 ALR 2d 15.
Uniform Commercial Code: burden of proof
as to commercially reasonable disposition of
collateral, 59 ALR 3d 369.
Uniform Commercial Code: failure of
secured creditor to give required notice of
disposition of collateral as bar to deficiency
judgment, 59 ALR 3d 401.
What constitutes a "public sale," 4 ALR 2d
575.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
F o r e c l o s u r e by a d v e r t i s e m e n t or sale
P e r i s h a b l e p r o p e r t y or livestock,
In proceeding under former section 9-1-6,
relating to mortgagor's right to enjoin foreclosure by advertisement and sale, court had

power, where it appeared that mortgaged
property was perishable, or that it was livestock and that cost of feeding and keeping it
pending action would be great, to call on
mortgagor to consent to sale or furnish
inclemnity bond to hoid mortgagee harn 11 css,
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the court otherwise orders. Notice of objection
and counsel within (5) days after service,
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen (1 5) days -*rr' •••*h*
merit and dismissal.
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon
the opposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage.
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or
decree is made,
(6) Except where • >1 ] ' ai • "vise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall con
tain the address or : • >_ ;ast known address of the judgment debtor and the
social security number of the judgment debtor if known,
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the
documents containing the stipulation or r i lotioi i upon which the order is
based.
(8) No orders, jv.
-crees based upon stipulation shall be signed
or entered unless
...u:_n
is in writing, signed by the attorneys of
t
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was
made on the record.
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a \v rittei i obligatioi i to pay
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written
obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel shall attach to the new complaint a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obligatioi i,

Rule 4-505. Attorneys 1 fees affidavits.
Intent:
To establish uniform criteria and a i;
of attorneys' fees.
Applicability:

.t ;>oi t

This rule shall govern tl le award of attorneys' fees in the trial courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys' fees must set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work performed by the
attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the
time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for which attorneys' fees are
claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services. The affidavit must also separately state hours by persons other than
attorneys, for time spent, work completed and hourly rate billed.
(2) If the fee arrangement with the client is other than at an hourly rate an
affidavit of the client or correspondence from the client shall be filed with the

Rn LIJ ; f 506
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court setting forth the terms ai id coi ,. liti : i is : I tl .e i i i i .i lge :r: I : i: it "I letl ler a
flat rate or contingent fee, or the p ei: cent age :)!: f I u ids i e ::c: ei ed oi dealt with,
(3) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sum which it is
expected will require considerable additional work to collect, the following
phrase may be included in the judgment after an award consistent with the
time spent to the point of default judgment, to cover additional fees incurred
in pursuit of collection:
U
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT
SHALL BE AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN COLLECTING
SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL
BE ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT."
(4) Judgments for attorney's fees should not be awarded except as they
conform to the provisions of this rule

Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for withdrawal of counsel in
civil cases.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record and not of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) An attorney may w itl ldi aw as counsel of record in all cases except where
withdrawal would result in a delay of trial. In that case, an attorney may not
withdraw without the approval cf the court
(2) When an attorney withdraw.- as counsel
- ol the
withdrawal must be served upon the client oi .
^' and
w
upon all other parties not in default and a certificate of service m
eu
with the court. If a trial date has been set, the notice of withdra
upon the client shall include a notification of the trial iaic.
(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or withdraws from
the case or ceases to act as an attorney, opposing counsel must notify the
unrepresented client of his/her responsibility to retain another attorney or
appear in person before opposing counsel can initiate further proceedings
against the client.
RUL.

'Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing trustee affidavits of deposit and
claimant petitions for adjudication of priority in trustee's sales.
To establish a uniform procedure in determining the disposition of f i inds :)ii
trustee's sales.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) At the time of depositing with the Clerk of the Court any proceeds from
a trustee's sale in accordance with I Jtah Code Ann. Section 57 ] -29, the

PREFERRED VEHICLE LEASE AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT, made tl i e _ 29th. _ _ _ l i | ail
between
_m _ _ _ _ __ m , _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ „

December

LMV LEASING, INC., 121 Freeport Road, Pittsburgh, PA

,
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hemnafter called "Lessor"
X*v.

A
N
D

MCQ^DBA/AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CAR. RENTAL

__

1380 W. North Temple Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84116

hereinafter called "Lessee".

—

"

———

WHEREAS, Lessee contemplates the leasing of various vehicles; and
WHEREAS, Lessor is willing to lease said vehicles upon the terms and conditions hereinafter
set forth;
NOW, THEREFORE* the parties hereto do mutually agree as follows*
1.

DEFINITIONS As herein usedt
1.1 "Accounting Form91 is a record with respect to a specific vehicle.
Accounting Form will show the date of delivery of the vehicle, the make,
manufacturer, model number, serial number, Agreed Price* Rental Payment,
Base Lease Term in months* Interim Rental, Interim Lease Term* location and
such other applicable details as Lessor and Leasee may desire.
1.2 "Acquisition Fee" is a charge made by Lessor for procuring each vehici
amount and manner of payment are set forth in Schedule "A".
1.3 "Administrative Fee" is a monthly service charge payable by Lessee
tgreed upon between Lessor and Lessee as set forth in Schedule "A",
i.» "Agreed Price* of any vehicle is determined as set forth in Schedule "A
1.5 "Base Lease Term", with respect to any vehicle* is the period commencing on the
15th day ol the month following the month in which such vehicle is first
delivered to Lettee and ending on the 14th day of the month identified in tl c
Purchase Order as the last month of the Base Lease Term.
1.6 "Basic Rent*, when used* combines and replaces Financing Charge" and "Monthly
Depreciation"* and* if used* is as set forth in Schedule "A".
1.7 'book Value" of any vehicle is the Agreed Price .less th i t a^|reg«| , /( i i;
Depreciating
l.S "Extended Rental* is a charge made by Lessor and payable by Lessee as set fort'
in Schedule "A" for continuing to lease any vehicle beyond, the Base Lease Te
therof.
L..9 "Financing Charge* is a component of is: 1 ) it rmonthly Rental Payment deterf
is set forth in Schedule "A".
1 10 "Interim Lease Term"* with respect to any vehicle* is (a) in the case of
by the manufacturer* the period commencing on the 10th day foil'
shipping date (as set forth in the manufacturer's invoice* a copy of wh
delivered to Lessee) of such vehicle by the manufacturer thereof an<*
of delivery by anyone other than the manufacturer* commencing '
delivery of such vehicle to Lessee and ending, in each

Interim Lease Term") plus (b) tne perioc, n any, commencing on trie
day on which Laaaaa raturna such vahlcla to Lessor In connection with
Lessee*a axarciaa of any option to terminate the lease of such
vehicle prior to the regularly schedule expiration of the Base Lease
Tars thereof (provided that on such day Lessee pays to Lessor the
monthly Rental Payment due on such date, if any), and ending on the
day on which Leaaor shall have received the net proceeds of sale of
such vehicle together with any termination payment due under Section
19 from Lessee with respect to such sale the ("Second Interim Lease
Term").
1.11

1.12

1.13

1.14

1.15

1.16.
1.17

1.18

2.

"Interim Rental" is the amount payable by Lessee to Lessor with
respect to the lease of any vehicle during the Interim Lease Term
thereof and shall be equal to the Financing Charge multiplied by the
unamortized balance of the Agreed Price, computed on the basis of a
360-day year and twelve 30-day months, for the actual number of days
involved•
"Monthly Depreciation" for any vehicle is that portion of the monthly
Rental Payment which is used to reduce the Agreed Price to Book
Value.
"Overall Lease Term" with respect to any vehicle is the period
consisting of the Interim Lease Term and the Base Lease Term thereof;
provided, however, that it also includes any other period, whether
prior to the Interim Lease Term or the subsequent to the expiration
or other termination of the Base Leaae Term or the Interim Lease
Term, ae the case may be, during which Lessee has possession of such
vehicle (including any period contemplated by Section 3.4.
"Purchase Order" la a form supplied or approved by Lessor and signed
(or electronically entered) by Lessee that specif lea the Lessee's
preference as to delivery area, date of delivery, vehicle to be
furnished, the make, manufacturer, model number, color, accessories,
optional items and any other features to be furnished and the number
of months in the Baae Leaae Term.
"Rental Payment" la the amount payable by Lessee to Lessor each month
for the uae of a specific vehicle during the Base Leaae Term thereof
and conalata of, but is not necessarily limited tot
Monthly Depreciation (1.12 above)
Baalc Rent (1.6 above)
Financing Charge (1.9 above)
Maintenance (6 below)
Administrative Fee (1.3 above)
Taxea and Pees (7 below)
"Settlement Fee" la a charge made by Leaaor at termination of the
leaae of each vehicle aa set forth in Schedule "A".
"Termination Value", with reapect to any vehicle, is the amount
determined in accordance with Exhibit "I" and payable pursuant to
Section 19.
"Vehicle" means one or more automobiles, vana, trucks or similar
iteme.

LXAJI /U.WIHisTT
2.1
Leaaor hereby leaaea to Lessee, and the Leasee hereby leases from
Lessor, the vehicles described in Accounting Forma delivered and/or
to be delivered upon the terme and conditions set forth in this
Agreement, aa supplemented with reapect to each vehicle by the terms
and condition a aet forth in the appropriate Accounting Form
identifying auch vehicle.
2.2
The vehiclee to be leased hereunder shall be those identified and
specified in Purchase Orders placed by Leasee with Lessor from time
to time and which Leaaor undertakea to have delivered to Lessee. In
the event the usual supplier of any particular vehicle la unable to
provide the **m* in time to meet the delivery date specified by
Lessee, Leeeor and Lessee shall agree on substituted actions
appropriate to the circumstance.
Upon delivery of any vehicle,
Lessee shall
-2-

d t | i ¥ f r t 0 LfSSor a

3

"

delivery receipt signed by the individual to whom delivery is
authorized 'by Lessee. Upon delivery of a vehicle to Lessee, Lessor md Lessee
shall exedite an • Accounting Form with respect to such vehicle. Except as
specifically modified with respect to any vehicle by the terms and conditions set
forth in the appropriate Accounting Form identifying such vehicle, ail of the
terms and conditions of this Agreement shall govern the rights and obligations of
Lessor and Lessee. Whatever reference is made to "this Agreement11 it shall be
deemed to include, as required., the one or more Accounting Forms identifying
the vehicle,
"
i I Each vehicle shall at all times be the sole and exclusive property of Lessor, and
Lessee shall have no right, title or interest therein except the right to use the
same as herein provided. As long as Lessee is not in default in any obligation to
Lessor, Lessee may use the vehicles in the regular course of its business for any
lawful purpose.
ERM
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Form relating thereto.
This Agreement shall remain in effect until such time as no further vehicles are
subject hereto and until Lessee has satisfied in full all of its obligations to Lessor
with respect to any vehicle at any time leased hereunder. Provided that no
Event of Default shall have occurred and be continuing, the termination of this
Agreement in respect of any vehicle shall not affect any other vehicle subject
hereto at the time of such termination and any such other vehicle shall remain
subject to the terms of this Agreement and the appropriate Accounting Form
identifying such other vehicle.
33 Lessee may retire from service any vehicle leased pursuant to this Agreement by
giving to Lessor written notice and surrendering possession of such vehicle to
Lessor at the point where same was originally delivered to Lessee, or at such
other point as may be mutually agreed upon. The lease as to such vehicle shall
terminate upon the date such vehicle is sold by Lessor pursuant to Section 19,
subject, howeverf to the provisions hereof including, but not limited to, Sections
16 and 19.
At Lessee's option any vehicle may be continued in service beyond tl ic Base
Lease Term thereof, in which event (a) the monthly rental due therefor during
such continuation will be the Extended Rental and (b) no Interim Rental will be
payable with respect to any Second Interim Lease Term of such vehicle.
RENTAL PAYMENTS
*.l Lessee agrees to pay Lessor, as rent for each vehicle leased hereunder, Interim
Rental and monthly Rental Payments, and any other charges due, during each
month oi the Overall Lease Term with respect to such vehicle in such amounts as
are set forth in the Accounting Form relating to such vehicle and are calculated
in accordance with methods of computation set forth in Schedule "A*. With
respect to each vehicle, all rent and other charges shall be due and payable on or
before the fifteenth (15th) day oi each month during the Overall Lease Term
thereof,
commencing with the first such fifteenth (13th) day after the
commencement of the Interim Lease Term with respect to such vehicle. A
LATE CHARGE OF 2% OF THE AMOUNT DUE WITH A MINIMUM CHARGE OF
$2.00 WILL BE ADDED TO EACH SUCH PAYMENT UNPAID ON THE DUE
DATE AND THE SAME CHARGE WILL BE AODED FOR EACH SUBSEQUENT
MONTH OR PART THEREOF ON WHICH SUCH PAYMENT REMAINS UNPAID-3-
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With respect to any vehicle returned to Lessor pursuant to Section 3J, monthly
Rental Payments shall cease on the day after the return date*
Interim Rental and monthly Rental Payments shall be paid to Lessor at the
address set forth above or such other address as Lessor shall provide to Lessee.

5.

WARRANTIES
LESSOR, NOT BEING THE MANUFACTURER OR A DISTRIBUTOR OF THE
VEHICLES NOR THE MANUFACTURER'S OR A DISTRIBUTOR'S AGENT, MAKES NO
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION OF ANY KIND WHATSOEVfcR
WITH RESPECT TO ANY VEHICLE, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO: THE
MERCHANTABILITY OF THE VEHICLE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
PURPOSE; THE DESIGN OR CONDITION OF THE VEHICLE; THE QUALITY OR CAPACITY
OF THE VEHICLE; THE WORKMANSHIP IN THE VEHICLE; COMPLIANCE OF THE
VEHICLE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ANY LAWf RULE, SPECIFICATION OR
CONTRACT PERTAINING THERETO; PATENT INFRINGEMENT; IT BEING AGREED THAT
THE VEHICLES ARE LEASED "AS IS", WITHOUT LIMITING THE GENERALITY OF THE
FOREGOING, LESSOR SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DEFECTS, EITHER LATENT OR
PATENT IN ANY VEHICLE, OR FOR ANY DIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE
THEREFROM, OR FOR ANY LOSS OF USE THEROF OR FOR ANY INTERRUPTION IN
LESSEE'S BUSINESS BY ITS INABILITY TO USE ANY VEHICLE FOR ANY REASON
WHATSOEVER.
Lessee will be subrogated to Lessor's claims, ii any, agamst the
manufacturer or supplier of any vehicle for breach of any warranty or representation, by
such manufacturers or suppliers and, upon written request from Lessee, Lessor shall take all
reasonable action requested by Lessee to eniorce any such warranty, express or implied,
issued on or applicable to any vehicle which is enforceable by Leseor in its own name,
provided, however, that (a) no Event of Default has occurred and (b) Lessor shall not be
obligated to take any action to enforce any such warranty unless Lessee shall pay all
expenses in connection therewith. Upon request by Lessor, Lessee shall pay Lessor's
reasonably estimated costs in advance* Notwithstanding the foregoing. Lessee's obligations
to pay the Interim Rental, monthly Rental Payments and other charges under this
Agreement shall be and are absolute and unconditional. All proceeds of any such warranty
recovered from the manufacturer or supplier of a vehicle shall first be used to repair the
affected vehicle*
6.

MAINTENANCE REPAIRS, OPERATING EXPENSES AND RETURN OP VEHICLES.
6.1 Unless otherwise specified in a schedule hereto separately signed by Lessor,
Lessee will pay for all maintenance and repairs to keep the vehicles in good
working order and condition and any other expenses associated with operating
the vehicles. Lessee will service the vehicles according to the manufacturers'
recommendations as outlined in the owner's manual and the maintenance
schedule folder accompanying each vehicle*
6.2 Lessee will return each vehicle at the end of the lease thereof in good condition
with no excessive wear and tear including, among other things* (1) no glass
breakage or discoloration, (2) no damage or deterioration of body, fenders, metal
work, trim or paint, (3) no original equipment including wheel covers or tires
(including spare) that are missing or not in safe condition, (6) no damage from
flood water, hail, or sandy and (7) no damage or alteration that makes the vehicle
either unsafe or unlawful to operate.
6.3 Lessee shall comply with any and all governmental requirements affecting the
maintenance, operation or use of each of the vehicles including, without
limitation, any changes or safeguards therein to keep each of the vehicles in such
compliance. Any replacement parts, changes in or improvements to each of the
vehicles shall become and remain the property of Lessor*
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7.

LICENSE, REGISTRATION, TAXES AND INSPECTION.
Lessee will be responsible lor payment for titling, registration and licensing and all
inspections of the veriicles required by any government authority during the overall lease
term. Lessee must pay for all excise, sale, use, personal property, gross receipts, and other
taxes incurred, or assessed by federal, state or local governments, during the Overall Lease
Term whether with respect to this Agreement or the ownership, lease, use or operation of
the vehicle, or with respect to the receipt of rental and other payments by Lessor, except
those taxes levied on the net income of the Lessor, provided that the foregoing exception
shall not apply to any such net income taxes which are in substitution for, or relieve the
Lessee from the payment of, taxes which it would otherwise be obligated to pay or
reimburse. Lessee shall comply with all federal, state, county and municipal statutes,
ordinances, rules, and regulations which may be applicable to the leasing, use, insuring,
condition, maintenance or operation of the vehicles hereunder, and shall prepare and furnish
to Lessor all documents, returns, or forms legally required thereunder. Lessee shall provide
all drivers or other operators of the vehicles and shall be soley responsible for any and all
fines, penalties and forfeitures (including, without limitation, the confiscation of any of the
vehicles) arising out of or due to the use, operation, condition, maintenance or insuring of
each of the vehicles in violation of any law, regulation, statute or similar requirement of
any governmental authority.
8.

DELIVERY
5.1 Lessor will not be responsible for any loss resulting from delay in delivery of any
vehicle.
8.2 Lessee hereby warrants to Lessor that any person accepting delivery of any
vehicle has authority to do so on behalf of Lessee and that the signature of such
person on any document executed in connection herewith shall be binding on
Lessee.

9.

USE.
9.1 Lessee will allow only licensed drivers to operate the vehicles and Lessee agrees
that Lessee (if a natural person) and all such licensed drivers are drivers in good
standing under the laws of the state in which they are licensed and- have not
within the past five (5) years had any driver's license suspended or revoked or had
any insurance premium adjusted because of a poor driving record.
9.2 Lessee will keep the vehicles free of all fines, liens and encumbrances. If Lessor
receives notice' of any motor vehicle violation relating to any vehicle, Lessor
may charge Lessee a reasonable service charge, as determined by Lessor from
time to timet for processing such notice. Nothing in this Section 9.2 shall
require Lessor, however, to take any action with respect to such notice.
9.3 Lessee will not use the vehicles illegally, improperly or for hire, or permit such
use*
9.4 Lessee will not use the vehicles to pull trailers unless designed for that purpose.
9.5 L si see will not remove the vehicles from the continental United States.
9.6 Lessee will not alter, mark or install equipment in the vehicles without Lessor's
written consent*
9.7 Lessee will not change the locations at which the vehicles are permanently
garaged without prior notification to Lessor of such relocation*

10.

OWNERSHIP.
10.1 This Agreement is a lease only and Lessor remains the owner of the vehicles*
This Agreement is a net lease and Lessee shall not be entitled to any abatement
of Interim Rentals, Rental Payments or other amounts payable hereunder or
reduction thereof, including, but not limited to, abatements or reductions due to
any present or future claims of Lessee against Lessor under this Agreement or
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otherwise, or against the manufacturer or vendor of the vehicles nor. except as
otherwise Jxpressly provided herein, shall this Agreement terminate, or the
respective obligations of Lessor or Lessee be otherwise affected, by reason of
any defect in.or damage to or loss or destruction of aU or any of the vehicles
from whatsoever cause, the taking or requisitioning of ail or any vehicles by
condemnation or otherwise, the prohibition by law of Lessee's use of ail or any
vehicles, the interference with such use by any private person or corporation, the
invalidity or unenforceability or lack of due authorization or other infirmity of
this Agreement, or lack of right, power or authority of Lessor to enter into this
Agreement, or for any other cause whether similar or dissimilar to the foregoing,
any present or future law to the contrary notwithstanding, it being the intention
of the parties hereto that the rents and other amounts payable by Lessee
hereunder shall continue to be payable in ail events unless the obligation to pay
the same shall be terminated pursuant to the terms hereof*
10.2 Lessee will not transfer, sublease, or rent any of the vehicles or do anything to
interfere with Lessor1* ownership of the vehicles* Lessee agrees that this Lease
will be treated as a true lease for federal income tax purposes and that unless
there is a written agreement with Lessor to the contrary, Lessor will receive all
of the tax and other benefits of ownership of the vehicles and Lessee will not
claim any depreciation or ACRS deductions or investment tax credits with
respect to the vehicles* Lessee will, from time to time, execute such statements
as may be requested by Lessor in order to confirm Lessor's ownership of the
vehicles and Lessor's right to claim such tax benefits with respect thereto*
11.

RISK OF LOSS AND INSURANCE.
AU risks of loss from public liability, damage to property or third persons, or damage
to each vehicle, whether caused by an unavoidable casualty, accident, abuse or misuse
thereof by Lessee, its employees, agents or others, shall be borne by Lessee* Lessee shall
provide public liability and prupei tf kmsge coverage, coverage •gtimr fire end rtaff end
ssmpisMaiim and *=*****—+*=*mmmQ* with a responsible qualified insurance company
acceptable to Lessor, protecting the interests of Lessor and Lessee against liability for
damages for personal injury or death, property damage to others, or damage to the vehicles
wherever such vehicles may be used or be located, ail as set forth in Schedule "A". Said
insurance shall not be excess over other coverage, but shall be primary insurance up to and
including the limits set forth in Scheduled*. Said insurance policies shall be satisfactory to
Lessor as to form and substance, shall be payable to Lessor or its assigns *s their interests
may appear and shall name Lessor as an additional named insured without liability for
premiums* Said policies shaill provide for at least ten (10) days written notice of
cancellation to Lessor or its assigns and Lessee shall furnish certificates, policies or
endorsements to Lessor or any such assigns as proof of such insurance* Lessor or its assigns
may act as attorney for Lessee in making, adjusting or settling any claims under any
insurance policies insuring the vehicles* Lessee assigns to Lessor all of its right, title, and
interest to any-infurance policies insuring the vehicles, including all rights to receive the
proceeds of insurance not in excess of the unpaid obligations under this Lease, and directs
any insurer to pay all such proceeds directly to Lessor or its assigns and authorizes Lessor or
its assigns to endorse Lessee's name on any draft for such proceeds* No such loss, danuge,
theft or destruction of any vehicle, in whole or part* shall impair the obligations of Lessee
under this Agreement, all ol which shall continue in full force and effect subject to Lessee's
right to terminate the lease of any vehicle pursuant to Section 3*3* After compliance with
the foregoing to Lessor's satisfaction, and provided no Event of Default has occurred and is
continuing. Lessee shall be subrogated to Lessor's rights with respect to any insurance
policies or claims for reimbursement by others with respect to such loss.
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GENERAL INOEMNITY.
Lessee assumes liability for and hereby agrees to indemnify, protect, and save and
keep harmless Lessori its agents, servants, successors and assigns from and against all
claims, whether or not due in whole or in part to any act or omission or other negligence of
Lessor, its agents, servants, successors, assigns or any of their employees, for losses,
damages, injuries, costs, expenses, attorneys' fees and court costs arising out of the use,
condition (including, but not limited to, latent and other defects, whether or not
discoverable by it), or operation of any vehicle, regardless of where, how and by whom
operated or arising out of or resulting from the condition of the vehicles sold or disposed of
after use by Lessee or, if Lessee shall not take delivery of any vehicle hereunder, after
Lessee shall have signed (or electronically entered) a Purchase Order with respect to such
vehicle arising out of or resulting from any claims that the manufacturer or supplier of such
vehicle may assert against Lessor with respect to such Purchase Order . Lessee shall
assume the settlement of, and the defense of any suit or suits, or other legal proceedings
brought to enforce all such losses, damages, injuries, claims, demands and expenses, and
shall pay all judgments entered in any such suit or suits or other legal proceedings. The
indemnities and assumptions of liabilities and obligations herein provided for shall continue
in full force and effect from and after the date of Lessee's execution of this Agreement,
notwithstanding the subsequent termination hereof by expiration of time, by operation of
law, or otherwise. Lessee shall indemnify, protect and save and keep harmless Lessor, its
agents, servants, successors and assigns from and against all liability arising under Title IV
of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Saving Act, P.L. 92-313, and similar laws of any
other jurisdiction relating to false or inaccurate odometer readings* Lessee hereby
represents and warrants that this Agreement constitutes a "qualified motor vehicle
operating agreement11, as defined in Section 16* (f) (13) of the Internal Revenue Code, and
shall indemnify Lessor in the event of the incorrectness of such representation and warranty
pursuant to this Section 12. Lessee is an independent contractor and nothing contained in
the Agreement shall authorize Lessee or any other person to operate any vehicle so as to
incur or impose any liability or obligation for or on behalf of Lessor.
13.

ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLEASE BY lP\SffE| CHANCE IN CONTROL.
13.1 Without Lessor's prior written consent, Lessee may not, by operation or law or
otherwise} (a) assign, transfer, pledget hypothecate or otherwise dispose of this
Agreement or any interest therein or (b) sublet or lend the vehicles or permit the
same to be used by anyone ~other than Lessee or Lessee's employees, except that,
following written notice to Lessor, it may sublet the same to any of its present
or future subsidiaries or affiliated companies, but every such sublease shall be
subject and subordinate to the terms of this Agreement and shall in no event
relieve Lmee ol its obligations hereunder, and each such sublessee shall, in
addition, agree in writing with Lessor at the time of the sublease to be bound by
the terms and conditions hereof.
13.2 If there is a change in control of Lessee, such change in control shall be deemed
o be a transfer of this Agreement for purposes of Section 13.1. In addition to
ny actual change of control a change in control shall be deemed to occurred if,
t any timet the ownership of more than 30 percent of either the voting power of
alue of the equity interests in Lessee is different than on the date hereof.

4MENT BY LESSOR.
t purpose of providing funds for financing the purchase of vehicles to be leased
r for any other purpose, Lessor may assign to any third party all or any part of
le and interest in and to this Agreement and in and to the vehicles and monies
due and to become due to the Lessor hereunder. In such event all the provisions of this
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Agreement for the benefit of Lessor shall, to the extent of the rights assigned, inure to the
benefit of and may, to'such extent, be exercised by or on behalf of such third party, and ail
rental payments and 'other amounts due and to become due under this Agreement and
assigned to such third party, upon notice by Lessor or assignee to Lessee, shall be paid
directly to such third party, and THE RIGHTS OF SUCH ASSIGNEE SHALL NOT BE
SUBJECT TO ANY DEFENSE, COUNTERCLAIM OR SET-OFF WHICH LESSEE MAY HAVE
AGAINST LESSOR, for any claim of the Lessee whatsoever; whether arising from breach of
warranty or representation relating to any vehicle, or arising from the termination of this
Agreement or of any lease of any vehicle hereunder, or arising from the breach or failure of
Lessor to observe or perform any of the terms or provisions of this Agreement or of any
other agreement or transaction whatsoever between Lessor and the Lessee. Lessee agrees
to make prompt payment to such third party of the rentals and other amounts so assigned
even though bankruptcy, reorganization, arrangement, insolvency, liquidation or dissolution
proceedings are instituted by or against the Lessor and regardless of whether a trustee or
receiver in any such proceedings shall assume or reject this Agreement. In the event of such
assignment, the liability of Lessee to pay such third party the full amount of the rental and
other sums assigned with respect to each vehicle hereunder shall not be terminated,
notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary, unless (1) Lessee shall have paid
such third party all assigned sums due hereunder with respect to such vehicle or (2) such
third party or Lessor shall have furnished to Lessee a release executed by such third party
in substantially the following form:
"The vehicle herein described has been released from the assignment made by
LMV LEASING, INC, to the undersigned". (Signature of third party or
authorized officer to be added.)
Such third party shall have no obligation or liabilities under this Agreement by reason of or
arising out of such assignment, nor shall such third party be required or obligated in any
manner to perform or fulfill any duties or obligations of the Lessor under this Agreement.
15.

LESSOR'S PERFORMANCE OF LESSEE OBLIGATIONS*
If Lessee shall fail to duly and promptly perform any of its obligations under this
Agreement with respect to any vehicle, Lessor may (at its option) perform any act or make
any payment which Lessor deems necessary for the maintenance and preservation of such
vehicle and Lessor's title thereto, including payments for satisfaction of liens, repairs,
taxes, levies and insurance and all sums so paid or incurred by Lessor, together with interest
at the maximum rate permitted by law from the date of payment, and any reasonable legal
fees incurred by Lessor in connection therewith shall be additional amounu due under this
Agreement and payable by Lessee to Lessor on demand. The performance of any act or
payment by Lessor as aforesaid shall not be deemed a waiver or release of any obligation or
default on the part of Lessee.
16.

TAX INDEMNITY.
This Section 16 applies unless otherwise specified in Exhibit "l".
16.1 If (a) for any reason other than a Law Change (as hereinafter defined) Lessor is
not entitled to claim or shall have reduced or disallowed all or any portion of the
investment tax credit or the depreciation or ACR5 deductions described in
Exhibit Hl" ("Tax Benefits") or any such Tax Benefits are recaptured or deferred
in whole or in part pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code of 19*4, as amended (a
"Tax Benefits Loss") or (b) there occurs a Law Change that would result in a
reduction of Lessor's aiter-tax yield from the leasing of any vehicle hereunder (a
"Law Change Loss"), then Lessee shall pay to Lessor as additional rent such
amount as* after deduction of all taxes required to be paid by Lessor in respect

16.2

16.3

16.4

16.3

of the receipt thertof under the laws of any governmental or taxing authority in
the United States, shall be required to cause Lessor's net return and cash flow to
equal the net return and cash flow that would have been available to Lessor if it
(1) Lessor had been entitled to the utilization of the Tax Benefits or (ii) such Law
Change had not occurred (in either casef the "Tax Indemnity Amount"). For
purposes hereof, "Law Change" means any amendment of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 that is enacted after the date on which the Overall Lease Term
commences as to a particular vehicle.
Lessor shall be responsible lor, and shall not be entitled to a payment "by Lessee
on account of9 any Tax Benefits Loss arising solely as a direct result of the
occurrence of any one or more of the following eventst (i) the failure of Lessor
to timely and properly claim Tax Benefits (unless tax counsel to Lessor shall
have advised it that such Tax Benefits cannot properly be claimed for any
vehicle on the tax return of Lessor (or the consolidated Federal taxpayer group
of which Lessor is a part); or (ii) the failure of Lessor (or the consolidated
Federal taxpayer group of which Lessor is a part) to have sufficient taxable
income before depreciation or ACRS deductions with respect to the vehicles to
offset the full amount of any such depreciation or ACRS deduction or to have
sufficient tax liability to utilize the investment tax credit with respect to the
vehicles.
Lessor promptly shall notify Lessee in writing of any Tax Benefits Loss or Law
Change Loss and of the Tax Indemnity Amount relating thereto and Lessee shall
pay to Lessor such Tax Indemnity Amount within thirty (30) days of such notice.
For purposes of this Section 16, a Tax Befietttr Loss shall occur upon the earliest
of (i) the happening of any event (such as a change in use of any vehicle or a
disposition of a vehicle by Lessor after Lessee has terminated the lease of such
vehicle before the end of the Base Lease Term thereof) which may cause such
Tax Benefits Loss; (ii) the payment by Lessor (or the consolidated Federal
taxpayer group of which Lessor is a part) to the Internal Revenue Service or a
state or local taxing authority of the tax increase resulting from such Tax
Benefits Loss; or (Ui) the adjustment of the tax return of Lessor (or the
consolidated Federal taxpayer group of which Lessor is a part) by an examining
agent to reflect such Tax Benefits Loss; for purposes hereof9 a Law Change Loss
shall occur upon the effective date of such Law Change.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, following the sale or other disposition of a
vehicle by Lessor, if no Tax Benefits Loss has previously occurred with respect
to such vehicle, a Tax Benefits Loss shall (unless Lessee shall have paid in full
the Termination Value of such vehicle pursuant to Section 19) be deemed to have
resulted and the Tax Indemnity Amount with respect thereto shall be that
amount determined by multiplying the factor set forth on Exhibit HP by the
Agreed Price*
Lessee's obligations under this Section shall survive the termination of this
Agreement.

i 7.

EVENTS OP DEFAULT.
Lessee shall be in default under this Agreement with respect to all vehicles acquired
hereunder upon the happening of any of the following events or conditions ("Events of
Default"):
17.1 Default by Lessee in payment of any Interim RentaU or Rental Payment or any
other indebtedness or obligation now or hereafter owed by Lessee to Lessor
under this Agreement or otherwise;
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17.2 Default in the performance of any obligation, covenant or liability contained in
this Agreement or any other agreement or document with Lessor, and the
continuance of such default for ten (10) consecutive days after written notice
thereof by Lessor to Lessee;
17.3 Any warranty, representation or statement made or furnished to Lessor by or on
behalf of Lessee or any permitted sublessee proves to have been false m any
material respect when made or furnished;
17.* Loss, theft, damage, or destruction of any vehicle not covered by insurance or
the attempted sale or encumbrance by Lessee of any vehicle, or the making of
any levy, seizure or attachment thereof or thereon;
17.3 Dissolution, termination of existence, discontinuance of its business, insolvency,
business failure, or appointment of a receiver of iny part of the property of, or
assignment for the benefit of creditors by, Lessee or any permitted sublessee or
the commencement of any proceedings under any insolvency, bankruptcy,
reorganization or arrangement laws by or against Lessee or any permitted
sublessee; or
17.6 Lessee or any permitted sublessee shall fail generally to pay its debts as they
become due, or shall take any corporate action in furtherance of any Event of
Default.
Anything to the contrary contained in the preceding provisions of this Section 17
notwithstanding! in the event that the Lessor shall have assigned to one or more third
parties all or any part of its right, title and interest hereunder, each such third party shall,
to the extent of the rights assigned to it, have the right to determine whether the happening
of any of the foregoing events or conditions (a) with respect to any Interim Rentals of
Rental Payments or other payment not assigned to such third party, or (b) with respect to
any of the Lessee's obligations, covenants, liabilities, representations and warranties
regarding any vehicle, rights to which have not been assigned to such third party, shall
constitute Events of Default for purposes of such third party's rights in and to trus
Agreement.
In the event of an affirmative election in writing by any such third party to treat an
event or condition described in the preceding clause (a) or clause (b) as an Event of Default,
for purposes of such third party's rights hereunder, such third party shall, to the extent of
the rights assigned to it, be entitled to exercise the remedies provided for in Section 18.
Absent such an affirmative election by such third party, (i) the rights assigned to such third
party shall be deemed, for purposes of this Section 17, to arise under a separate lease
agreement and (ii) there shall not be any cross-default between such deemed separate lease
agreement and this Agreement.
IS.

REMEDIES OF LESSOR.
Upon the occurrence of any Event of Default and at any time thereafter:
1S.1 Lessor may without any further notice exercise one or more of the following
remedies, as Lessor in its sole discretion shall elect: (a) declare all unpaid rentals
under this Agreement (discounted, however, to their then present value at a
discount rate of 6% per annum) to be immediately due and payable; (b) terminate
this Agreement as to any or all vehicles! (c) take possession of the vehicles
wherever found, and for this purpose enter upon any premises of Lessee or any
other person and remove the vehicles, without liability for suit, action or other
proceeding by the Lessee or any person acting by, for or under Lessee, and
remove the same; (d) cause Lessee at its expense promptly to return the vehicles
to Lessor in the condition set forth in Section 6.2; (e) use, hold, sell, repair, lease
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or otherwise dispose of the vehicles on the premises of Lessee or any other
location Without afftcting the obligations of Lessee as provided in this
Agreement (f) sell or lease the vehicles at public auction or by private sale or
lease at such time or times and upon such terms as Lessor may determine, free
and clear of any rights of Lessee and, if notice thereof is required by law, any
notice in writing of any such sale or lease by Lessor to Lessee not less than ten
(10) days prior to the date thereof shall constitute reasonable notice thereof to
Lessee; (g) proceed by appropriate action either at law or in equity to enforce
performance by Lessee of the applicable covenants of this Agreement or to
recover damages for the breach thereof; and (h) exercise any and all rights
accruing to a lessor under any applicable law upon a default by a lessee.
18.2 In addition. Lessor shall be entitled to recover immediately as liquidated
damages, and not as a penalty, a sum equal to the aggregate of the following: (a)
all unpaid rentals or other sums which are due and payable hereunder up to the
date of redelivery to, or repossession by, Lessor; (b) any expenses paid or
incurred by Lessor in connection with exercising any of its remedies under
Section IS*I, including attorneys1 feest legal expenses and court costs; (c) ail
unpaid rentals due and to become due under this Agreement for any vehicle
which Lessee fails to return to Lessor as provided above or converts or destroys,
or which Lessor is unable to repossess; (d) the Tax Indemnity Amount (if Section
16 applies)} and (e) an amount equal to the difference between (i) all unpaid
rentals for any vehicle returned to or repossessed by Lessor from the date
thereof to the end of the term therefor plus the expected Termination Value (if
any) of such vehicle at the end of the term therefor, and (ii) the wholesale value
of each such vehicle on such date, provided* however, that the value of each
vehicle shall not exceed the proceeds of any sale thereof by Lessor. Should
Lessor, however, estimate its actual damages to exceed the foregoing, Lessor
may, at its option, recover its actual damages in-lieu thereof or in addition
thereto* Lessor shall not be obligated to sell, lease br otherwise dispose of any
vehicle hereunder if it would impair the sale, lease or other disposition of other
vehicles in the ordinary course of Lessor's business or vehicles which were
previously repossessed by Lessor from any party.
15.3 None of the remedies under this Agreement are intended to be exclusive, but
each shall be cumulative and in addition to any other remedy referred to herein
or otherwise available to Lessor at law or in equity and the third party election
set forth in the penultimate paragraph of Section 17 shall be exercisable so long
as the Events and Default described in clause (a) or (b) of said paragraph are
continuing. Any repossession or subsequent sale or lease by Lessor of any vehicle
shall not bar an action for a deficiency as herein provided, and the bringing of an
action or the entry of judgment against the Lessee shall not bar the Lessor's
right to repoesess any or ail vehicles. LESSEE WAIVES ANY AND ALL RIGHTS
TO NOTICE AND TO A JUDICIAL HEARING WITH RESPECT TO THE
REPOSSESSION OF THE VEHICLES BY LESSOR IN THE EVENT OF A DEFAULT
HEREUNDER BY LESSEE.
19.

TERMINATION.
At the end of the Base Lease Term of any vehicle or upon the termination of the lease
pursuant to Section It hereof by Lessor, or upon the exercise by Lessee of its right to retire
any vehicle from service pursuant to Section 3.3, Lessee will return such vehicle to Lessor
at the location specified in Section 3.3. Lessor will sell it at wholesale in a commercially
reasonable manner. If the net selling price is more than the amount (the "Termination
ValueM with respect to such vehicle) determined by applying the formula set forth in Exhibit
•11-

T (if a formula lor such determination appears therein or by multiplying the factor set
forth in Exhibit T by the Agreed Price, (if a table of factors for such determination appears
therein)* Lessor will p4y Lessee the surplus less any amounts owed under this Agreement. If
it is less* Lessee will pay. the deficiency plus any amounts owed under this Agreement, The
net selling price is the sale price less the sum of (a) Lessor's direct expenses of selling,
preparing and storing such vehicle and (b) the Settlement Fee shown on Schedule "A".
20.

FURTHER ASSURANCES
Lessee shall execute and deliver to Lessor, upon Lessor's request, such instruments,
opinions of counsel, authorizing resolutions, financing statements and assurances as Lessor
deems necessary for the confirmation or perfection of this Agreement and Lessor's rights
hereunder. In furtherance thereof, Lessor may file or record this Agreement or financing
statements with respect thereto so as to give notice to any interested parties. Any such
filing or recording shall not be deemed evidence that this Agreement is intended as security
or of any intent to create a security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code. Lessee
authorizes Lessor and Lessor's assignee and each subsequent assignee to file a financing
statement signed only by Lessor or such assignee in all places where such authorization is
permitted by law.
21.

SEVERABILITY.
Any provision of this Agreement that is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction
shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition and
unenforceability without invalidating the remaining provision hereof. To the extent
permitted by applicable law, Lessee hereby waives any provision of law which prohibits or
renders unenforceable any provisions hereof in any respect.
22.

NOTICES.
All notices, reports and other documents provided for herein shall be deemed to have
been given or made when mailed, postage prepaid, or delivered to a telegraph or cable
company, addressed to Lessor or Lessee at their respective addresses set forth above or such
other addresses as either of the parties hereto may designate in writing to the other from
time to time for such purpose.
23.

AMENDMENTS AND WAIVERS.
This Agreement, the Accounting Forms, Purchase Orders and Schedules executed by
Lessor and Lessee constitute the entire agreement between Lessor and Lessee with respect
to the vehicles and the subject matter of this Agreement. No term or provision of this
Agreement, the Accounting Forms, Purchase Orders and Schedules may be changed, waived,
amended or terminated except by a written agreement signed by both Lessor and Lessee,
except that Lessor may insert the serial number of any vehicle or other identifying
information on the appropriate documents after delivery of such vehicle, No express or
implied waiver by Lessor of any Event of Default hereunder shall in any way be, or be
construed to bet * waiver of any future or subsequent Event of Default, whether similar in
kind or otherwise/
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2k.

CHOICE OF LAW; CONSTRUCTION.
THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE BINDING, WHEN ACCEPTED BY LESSOR IN THE
COMMONWEALTH Off PENNSYLVANIA, AND SHALL BE CONSTRUED AND ENFORCED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH AND GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA. LESSEE CONSENTS TO THE EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER LESSEE BY ANY COURT OF RECORD SITTING IN PENNSYLVANIA IN
CONNECTION WITH ANY ACTION ARISING OUT OF THIS AGREEMENT, AND WAIVES
ALL OBJECTIONS TO VENUE IN ANY SUCH COURT AND TO SERVICE OF PROCESS ON
LESSEE AT ITS DESIGNATED ADDRESS FOR PURPOSES OF NOTICE HEREUNDER IN
ACCORDANCE
WITH THE PENNSYLVANIA
UNIFORM
INTERSTATE ANO
INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT OR ANY SUCCESSOR STATUTE IN CONNECTION
WITH SUCH ACTION. Lessee waives, insofar as permitted by law, trial by jury and right of
counterclaim in any action between the parties. The titles of the sections of this
Agreement are for convenience only and shall not define or limit any of the terms or
provisions hereof. Time is of the essence of this Agreement in each and ail of its provisions.
25.

PARTIES.
The provisions of this Agreement shall be binding upon, and inure to the benefit of, the
permitted assigns, representatives and successors of the Lessor and Lessee. If there is more
than one Lessee named in this Agreement, the liability of each shall be joint and several.
26.

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
Lessee will furnish Lessor (a) within k5 days of the dose of each fiscal quarter of
Lessee a balance sheet and profit and loss statement of Lessee as of the ^mi of such quarter,
(b) within 90 days after the close of each fiscal year of Lessee, a balance sheet and profit
and loss statement of lessee as of the end of such year, the yearly statement to be certified
by public accountants of recognized standing acceptable to Lessor, (c) such other financial
statements and information to be furnished promptly after the same is made available to
said stockholders, and (d) such other information respecting the financial condition and
operations of Lessee as Lessor may from time to time reasonably respect.
27.

CONFESSION OP JUDGMENT.
UPON OEFAULT LESSEE HEREBY EMPOWERS THE PROTHONOTARY OR ANY
ATTORNEY OF ANY COURT OF RECORD WITHIN THE UNITED STATES OR ELSEWHERE
TO APPEAR FOR IT AND, WITH OR WITHOUT ONE OR MORE DECLARATIONS FILED,
CONFESS A JUDGMENT OR JUDGMENTS AGAINST IT IN THE FAVOR OF LESSOR OR
ANY ASSIGNEE AS OF ANY TERM FOR THE UNPAID BALANCE HEREOF WITH COSTS
OF SUIT AND AN ATTORNEY'S COMMISSION OF 10% FOR COLLECTION, WITH
RELEASE OF ALL ERRORS AND WITHOUT STAY OF EXECUTION, AND INQUISITION
AND EXTENSION UPON ANY LEVY ON REAL ESTATE IS HEREBY WAIVED AND
CONDEMNATION AGREED TO, ANO THE EXEMPTION OF ALL PROPERTY FROM LEVY
AND SALE ON ANY EXECUTION THEREON, AND EXEMPTION OF WAGES FROM
ATTACHMENT, ARE ALSO HEREBY EXPRESSLY WAIVED, ANO NO BENEFIT
EXEMPTION SHALL BE CLAIMED UNDER OR BY VIRTUE OF ANY EXEMPTION LAW
NOW IN FORCE OR WHICH MAY HEREAFTER BE ENACTED.
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IT IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT
PROVISIONS HEREIN CONTAINED AFFECT AND WAIVE CERTAIN LEGAL RIGHTS OF
LESSEE AND HAVE BEEN READ, UNDERSTOOD AND VOLUNTARILY AGREED TO ay
LESSEE.
LESSEE HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF AN EXECUTED AND TRUE COPY
OF THIS LEASE.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, th« Lessor and Lessee, intending to be legally bound, have
caused these presents to be duly executed the day and year first above written.
MCQADBy

WITNESS:

LESSEE: U

RICAN
HAL CAR RENTAL

<„J~r
Accepted by Lessor this
Pittsburgh, PA 1323*.

*i/*/*?

*^ZZ.

A\J^£^^^^

CP^(

at

121 Freeport

Road,

> -^f., . . j ,

TERMINAL RENTAL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE
LRX. 1O0X13) Statement
The undersigned hereby certifies, under penalty of perjury, that it intends that more
than 30 percent of the use of the vehicles subject to the above Agreement will be in the
undersigned^ trade or business.
The und€f%ign^ has further been advised that it will not be treated as the owner of
the vehicles subject to the Agreement for federal income tax purposes and the undersigned
is not aware of any information which may lead Lessor to believe that this certification is
false.
iHt%
MCQMjA/AlffiRICAN
LESSEE*IN?TOWrfy5NAL CAR RENTAL

Date:

/- ^ r

-U-

SCHIDULE "A"
TO PREFERRED VEHICLE LEASE AGREEMENT
NON-TAX ORIEHTED

1.

ACQUISITION FEE
$75,00

2.

SETTLEMENT FEE
$75.00 par vehicle on vehicles sold by LMV on behalf of MCO, IncDBA/American International Car Rental.

3.

APPORTIONMENT OF EXCESS OF SALES OR SETTLEMENT PRICE IN EXCESS OF BOOK
VALUE AFTER DEDUCTION OF SETTLEMENT FEE.
Lessor shall pay to Lessee as a rental adjustment 100% of any such
excess. If the amount remain ins results in a deficiency, Lessee shall
pay to Lessor as rental adjustment the amount of such deficiency,
provided that Lessor shall guarantee to Lessee minimum net resals
proceeds equal to 201 of the Agreed Price at the beginning of the initial
lease term. If Lessse is otherwise permitted to and does elect to extend
the lease of any vehicle beyond the Base Lease Term, Lessor shall
guarantse 25X of the fair value of the vehicle at the inception of the
extension period.
"Fair value'1 shall be defined as 851 of resale value for
automobiles, and 70X of resale value on light trucks A9 reported by
"Automotive Market Report" published by Automotive Auction Publishing,
Inc., as of the publication date immediately preceding the last day of
the month which lamed lately precedes the month in vhlch termination %B to
the particular vehicle occurs.
Settlements of excess or deficiency from ressls, as dsscrlbed
above, shall be based on calendar-year-to-date tales.
Tentative
settlements vlll be made monthly, but adjusted quarterly, to year-to-date
results. For this purpose, e quarter is defined as a three-month period
ending March 31, June 30, September 30 and December 31.

4.

FINANCING CHARGE
Financing charges shall be charged at an Interest rate of tvo
parses* (21) in excess of the prime rate. The prime rate shall be that
rate chaYgad by Citibank, New York. This rate vlll be changed every month
by reference to the prime rate as reported by Citibank, Nev York on the
15th calendar day of the applicable lease period.

5.

ADMINISTRATIVE FEE
•0011 of the Agreed Price per month per vehicle. After forty-eight
months, the edmlnistrstive fee shall be 201 of the Monthly Rental Payment
per month per vehicle.

Page 1 of 5

6.AGREED PRICE
$100.00 over Dealer Invoice. This pricing applies only to ordered
vehicles customarily used by corporate fleets which are manufactured by
Bulck, Chevrolet, Chrysler, Dodge, Ford, Mercury, Oldsmobile, Plymouth,
Pontiac and Chevrolet, Dodge and Ford Trucks having a GVW of 11,000
pounds or under. This pricing is premised on continuation of the vehicle
manufacturers' existing pricing structure and dealer incentive programs
for the sale of motor vehicles to its dealers for 1987 models. In the
event the pricing structure or dealer Incentive is changed by any of the
manufacturers for 1987 or subsequent models, then the pricing agreed to
herein shall be null and void with respect to that manufacturer's vehicle
and the parties hereto agree to negotiate revised pricing*
If a motor vehicle is taken from the existing inventory of a dealer
or is ordered by LMV from a dealer specified by Lessee, LMV shall be
entitled to a fee of 2% over procurement cost.
7.

METHOD OF COMPUTATION FOR RENTAL PAYMENTS
Each Monthly Rental Payment shall be equal tot
I.

The Agreed Price lass the balloon Payment of each vehicle divided
by the Base Lease Term as set forth in the Accounting Form.

PLUS
II.

8.

The financing amount determined by multiplying the financing charge
by the preceding month's book value.

INSURANCE
In accordance with the provisions of paragraph
Agreement, Lessee is to provide Insurance as followsi

11

of

this

Comprehensive, fire, theft and collision Insurance for the actual
cast value of the equipment.
Lessee shall be responsible for any
deductible provision applicable to this insurance.
Lessee shall also
provide public liability Insurance with minimum limits of $250,000 per
parson and $500,000 per accident for bodily Injury and $250,000 for
property* or a combined single limit in the amount of $500,000.
LMV
Leasing, Inc. shall be named as additional insured and Lost Payee.
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LEASE TESM8 II MOUTHS
forty-sight (48) months*
The minima lssss t s m of any pises of
equipment lssss hsrsondsr is twelve (12) months. Unlets Lsssor otherwise
consents, the lesse with respect to sny pisce of equipment msy not be
terminated by Lessee prior to the end of the tvelfth (12th) month of the
Bass Lease Term thereof. In the event that Lessor so consents and the
lease is so terminated by Lessee, Lessee agrees that Lessor shsll be
entitled, in addition to the amount specified in Exhibit "I" hereto, to
reasonable administrative charges associated with such termination
including any residual value of the vehicle and any penalties and charges
imposed by financial institution.
EXTENDED RENTAL
Not Available
ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
Should any equipment leased hereunder be terminated or replaced
prior to the end of the Base Lease Term for the purpoeee (directly or
indirectly) of refinancing, Lessee agrees to pay to Lessor all costs and
penalties associated with such premature termination or replacement,
including, without limitation, any and all penalties of financial
institutions, rsasonable administrates charges of Lessor to effect such
premature termination or replacement and any loss of anticipated tax
benefits to Lsssor as specified in this Agreement*
Upon occurrence of a default by Lessee, or guarantor(s), if any, A§
provided for under this Agreement or under the terms of any other
agreement of lease entered into between Lessee and Lessor that has been
guaranteed by guarantor(s), if sny, Lessor at its option shsll havs and
may exercise, with respect to this Agreement or any other agreement or
lease, any and all rights and remedies available to Lessor under the
terms of this Agreement or any other agreement
or under the terms of
this Agreement or any other agreement or lease, at lav or in equity.
Except ae otherwise provided in paragraph 17
of this Agreement, a
default under the. terms of amy lease or agreement is, at Lessor's option,
a default under all leases or agreements between Lessor and Lessee and/or
guarantor, if any.
BR0KE1
Lessee represents and warrants that it has not retained a finder or
a broker in connection with this Lsase or the transactions contemplated
by this~-Le*ee. Lessor represents and warrants that it has not retained a
finder or a broker in connection with this Lease or the transactions
contemplated hereby other than Rental Car Leasing and Services Inc.,
whose fee mill be paid by Lessor alone. Lessee acknowledges that nslthsr
Rental
Car
Leasing
and
Services
Inc., nor
its
employees
or
repreeentatlvee are the employee, agent or representative of Lessor for
any purposes whatsoever and has not and cannot make any representation,
statements, promises, claims or contract modifications of any kind or ths
like on behalf of Lessor.
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CONTINUATION Of ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
13.

Add a nev section "2.4t
Lessee represents end varrants (e) thet
this Leese constitutes, end eech Schedule end attachment vhen executed
will constitute, e duly authorized end velid obligation of Lessee,
enforceable egeinst Lessee in accordance with the terms thereof, (b) thet
neither the execution by Lessee of this Lease and each Schedule nor its
performance thereof will result in any breach of, or constitute e default
under or a violation of Lessee's certificate of incorporation, Lessee's
by-lavs or any other governing instrument of Lessee, any lav, rule, or
regulation or any agreement, order or judgement, (c) thet Lessee is in
good standing in its state of incorporation art1 other form of organization
and is entitled to own properties and to carry on business in eech state
where any vehicle is to be located, (d) that no consent, t ling or other
action by or with any governmental agency or other regulatory body is
necessary for the acquisition and operation of the vehicles as
contemplated by this Lease, (e) that there is no litigation pending or
threatened against its obligations hereunder And (f) that all financial
statements furnished by Lessee to Lessor fairly present the financial
condition and results of operations of Lessee as of the respective dates
and for the respective periods covered end do not contain any untrue
statement, or any omission, of a material fact, and that since the date
of the most recent of such financial statements, there has occurred no
material adverse change in the business or condition of Lessee. Lessee's
execution of each Schedule shall constitute a reaffirmation of these
representations and warranties. Lessee shall provide Lessor an opinion
of counsel, acceptable to Lessor end lte counsel, that items 2.4(e)
through (e) are correct ae represented.

14.

On page 7, paragraph 12. GENERAL INDEMMITT Insert on line 3 after
"in part19 the follovingt "arising out of activities permitted hereunder
and/or (b) related".

15.

Modifications for paragraph 10.2 and 13.1. "The above paragraphs
notvithstending, Lessee may rent vehicles provided under this Leese for
periods of time, not to exceed the term of the vehicle under this Lease,
to licensed drivers over 21 years of ege and otherwise qualifying
hereunder.
This right to rent is expressly limited to rentals in the
normal course of Lessee's business under restrictions contained in the
Exhibit "A" - MCO, Inc. Standard Form Agreement.

16.

Add to paragraph 17.6 et the end, after "defaults" the following
as part of the last sentence, "Lessee shall fa J. to rent any vehicle in
accordance with the terms of Exhibit "A" or eny restrictions of this
Lease."

17.

DEPOSIT. Lessor has the right to demand Leeeee make end maintain a
deposit with Lessor equal to the last preceding monthly rentel et eny
given point in time. Failure by Leeeee to maintain such a deposit amount
with Lessor, upon Lessor's demand, shall be a breach of thle Agreement by
Leeeee end shall constitute a full Event of Default vlth all the
consequences thereof.

THIS SCHEDULE "A" IS AM ADDEHDOM TO THE ABOVE REFERENCED PREFERRED VEHICLE
LEASE AGREEMENT WITH CAPITALIZED TEEMS USED IN THIS ADDENDUM AMD MOT OTHERWISE
DEFIMED HESEDI HAVIHC THE RESPECTIVE MEAMIKGS AS SPECIFIED IM THE AGREEMENT.
THIS SCHEDULE IS INCORPORATED INTO AMD CONSTITUTES AM INTEGRAL PART OF THE
ABOVE REFERENCED AGREEMENT.

This Schedule "A" is part of the Preferred Vehicle Lease
Agreement dated December 29, 1986 betveea the parties and is
hereby made a part thereof.
LHV LEASING, INC., LESSOR
Byt
Tl t U t

-

^

^rtnft

MCOADBA/
AMERICAN I
B

7. X

Title
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PAL CAR RENTAL, LESSEE

DKCONDITIONAL AND IIIlfOCAlLl
CUAKAWTT OF FATMtKT

In coosldtrsti oo of tha auw of Tan Dollars ($10*00) aad
othar good and valua bio consldaratlona, tha racalpt and
•ufflciancy of which la hereby ackoovledgad f and for tha
putpoaa of aaaklog t o induct LMT Leaalng, Inc. ("Laiaor") to
aotar into a laaalof arraagawent with
MCO, INC. DBA/AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CAR RENTAT,

(•Lessee*), tha Undersigned, jolotly and severally If aort than
ooi, doaa haraby irrevocably and unconditionally guarantee to
Lessor, and to ita t r a o e f e r e e s , auecaaaora» and aaalgna tha
prompt paywant and perforwence of all euwe and othar
obligttiooi which ara dut or haraaftar way bacowa dua and tha
parforwaoca and obearvanca by Laaaaa of all of tha terwe,
conditions (Including thoaa partalolng to loauranca l i a b i l i t y ) ,
stipulations and agraawanta pursuant to that cartaln laasa
agreewent batwaan Ltssor and Leesee datad
December 29 t 198J
C L a a a a * ) , Including any and all renewals 9 w o d l f l e a t l o o s ,
awandwanta or e x t e n s i o n s , In whole or In part, wade with
raapact thereto*
Mo act , course of dealing, delay, or owleelon on the part
of La aeor In exercising or enforcing any of lta rights or
rawed laa und ar tba Laaaa or under thla lnatruwant executed In
conne ction w 1th tha Laaaa (Including tha ralaaaa of any
guara ntor of tha L a a a a ) shall Iwpalr or ba prejudicial to tha
right a and r awadlaa of Laaaor hereunder and tha anforcewent
harao f. Laa aor way axt a o d , wodlfy, or poatpona tha tlwa and
wanna r of pa ywaot and parforwaoca of tha t a r w s , conditions,
atlpu latlooa and agraawanta of tha Laaaa and any othar docuwant
or In struwan t In connection therewith, all without notlca to or
cooaa nt by t ha U n d e r a l g n e d . Laaaor way enforce tha provlalons
harao f from tlwa to tlwa aa often aa tha occasion therefore way
rarla a and L aaaor aball not ba required to flrat Initiate,
purau a or ax a r c l a a any of lta rlghta or rawadlaa agalnat any
othar paraoo or party primarily or secondarily liable under tha
Laaaa
Tha Undersigned agreei
governed by thw lawa of tha
Dndaralgnad h a r a b y consente
of tha Stata of Fenneylvanii

t ahall be
a and tha
of tha courta
herein*

II VITlIgg W H I I I O F , tl
delivered fhla lnetruwent ut

ecuted and
ay of

jr/fM
Signed, aa
in tha pra

nt 7 .
nd delivered
oft

UNCOHDITIONAL
COAIANTT

AKO U l I V O C A l l E
OF F A T H E W T

In c o o s l d t r t t loo of tht sua of T e a 0 o i l t r t ( $ 1 0 . 0 0 ) tad
o c h t r good tad w e l u t b l t c o n s i d t r t t l o o t f th o r t c t l p t tod
t u f f i c i t n c y of w h i c h li h t r t b y t c k o o w l t d g t d, and for th*
p u r p o s e of s e e k i n g to Induct LMT L t t t l n g , I n c . ("lessor") to
totir into t l o t t i n g t r r t n g t a t a t w i t h
_____________
M C O , INC. DBA / A M E R I C A N I N T E R N A T I O N A L CAR R E N T A L
( " L e s s e e " ) , tht U a d e r s l g o e d , J o i n t l y sod s a t t r t l l y If aort t h t o
o o t , dott h e r e b y l r r e t o c t b l y tad u a c o o d l t i o o t l l y g u t r t n t t t to
L t s s o r , tod to Itt t r t o t f t r t t t 9 t u e c t t t o r t » tnd t s s l g n s tht
proapt p t y a t o t tnd p t r f o r a t n e t of til tuaa tod othtr
o b l i g t t l o o a w h i c h trt dut or h t r t t f t t r a t y b t c o a t dut tod tht
p t r f o r a t o c t tad o b a t r t t o c a by L t t t t t of tl 1 of tht t e r a t ,
c o n d i t i o n s ( i n c l u d i n g t h o t t p t r t t i n i n g to l a s u r t a c t l i a b i l i t y ) ,
t t l p u l t t i o o t tnd t g r t t a t a t t p u r s u t a t to th at e t r t t i a ltttt
t g r t t a t o t b t t w t t a L t s s o r tad L t t t t t dtttd
D e c e m b e r 29 t l f g 6
C l a a a a " ) , i n c l u d i n g toy tad til r t a t w t l t , a o d l f lettloati
t a t n d a t n t t or t x t t n t l o o t , la w h o l e or la p t r t , atdt with
rtsptct t h t r t t o .
Ho tet» c o u r t t of d t t l i a g , d e i t y , or o a i s s i o n oa tht pttt
of L t t t o r la e x e r c i s i n g or e n f o r c i n g tay of Itt rightt or
r t a t d l t t u o d t r tht L t t t t or under thlt i o s t r u a e n t executed la
e o o a t e t l o a w i t h tht L t t t t ( i n c l u d i n g tht r t l t t t t of soy
g u t r t n t o r of tht L t t t t ) shtll i a p t i r or ba p r t j u d l c l t l to t h a
rightt tad r t a t d l t t of L t t t o r h t r t u o d t r tod tha t n f o r c t a t o t
htrtof.
L t t t o r a t y e x t e n d , a o d i f y , or p o t t p o o t tht tlat tnd
a t n n t r of p t y a t n t tad p t r f o r a t a e a of tht t e r a t , c o n d i t i o n s ,
t t l p u l t t i o o t tad t g r t t a t a t t of tha L t t t t tod toy othtr d o c u a t n t
or l o t t r u a a a t la e o a a t c t i o o t h t r t v l t h , til w i t h o u t ootict to or
c o o s t n t by tht U n d t r s i g n t d .
L t t t o r a t y t a f o r e t tht p r o v i s i o n s
h t r t o f f r o a t l a a to tlaa tt o f t t a tt tht o e c t t i o o t h t r t f o r t a t y
rtrltt tad L t t t o r s h t l l aot ba r e q o l r t d to flrtt i n i t l t t t ,
p u r t u t or t x t r c l s t tay of Itt r i g h t t or r t a t d l t t tgtlatt tay
o t h t r p t r t o o or p t r t y p r i a t r l l y or s t c o o d t r i l y l l t b l t u n d e r tha
Ltttt*
Tht U n d t r s i g n t d t g r t t t thtt thlt l n t t r u a t n t shtll bt
g o w a r o t d by t h a I t w t of tha S t t t a of P t o o t y l w t o l t tnd tht
U n d t r s i g n t d h t r t b y c o o t t a t t to tha J u r i t d i c t i o o of tha e o u r t s
of tht S t a c a of P t o a t y l t t n l t tad to b a l o g sutd t h t r t l a .
IB V I T M t t S w a i l t O P , tht U n d t r s i g n t d b s s t i e c u C t d snd
d t l i v t r t d thlt l a t t r u a t a t u o d t r tttl thlt //*£? dty of

S i g n t d , s e t l t d tnd d t l l v t r t d
in the p r e s e n c e of

^#£

2LM$L &LuM~
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LEASING, IMC.
A XEROX FINANCIAL

SERVICES CO>>'PA\r

Notice of Sale
To:

MCO, Inc., d/b/a/American
International Rent-A-Car
1380 North West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116

(This Notice is for informational
purposes only as to MCO, Inc.,
which is currently in a Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Proceeding)

Mr. Roy W. Mallory
2980 Apache Way
Provo, Utah 84604
Mr. and Mrs. Val Conhn
2214 Temple View Circle
Provo, Utah 84604
Mr. and Mrs. Tubber T. Okuda
1994 South 1175 East
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Pursuant to Section 18 of the Preferred Vehicle Lease Agreement ("Lease")
entered into between LMV LEASING, INC. ("Lessor") and MCO, Inc., d/b/a American
International Car Rental on December 29, 1986, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that
based the Lessee's default under the Lease, the Lessor will sell, as provided herein,
the vehicles listed on Schedule "A", attached hereto, with the proceeds from such
sale to be applied first to the costs of preparing the vehicles for sale, costs of sale,
and storage fees with any remaining proceeds to be credited toward the amount
owing Lessor by Lessee based on Lessee's default under the Lease.
Said vehicles will be sold after April 13, 1988, for the highest and best price in an
"AS IS" condition. Said vehicles are currently and will continue to be located, at the
time of said sale, at Nate Wade Subaru, 1207 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,
and will be sold in the same manner and fashion as other used vehicles located at
Nate Wade Subaru.
DATED this 4th

day of

April , 1988.
LMV LEASING, INC
By
tdward I. Mccracken
Title

Contoller

